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Abstract 
Developing autonomous agents capable of sustaining goal-oriented behaviour in 
unconstrained dynamic environ1nents requires the acquisition of skills sufficient 
for performing both perceptual conceptualisation and behavioural functionality. 
Such systems are expected to gain the cognitive categories hierarchically in order 
to 1nake learning an incrmnentally open-ended process. Acquiring representa-
tions in the form of internal motor parameters enables the mechanism of learning 
to construct a set of hypotheses that directly refer to physical properties of the 
world. A collection of a priori categories that are known to be 'correct' 1nust 
thus be innate to the system in order to constitute the initial representation of 
the environ1nent. Learning then proceeds by the development of novel cognitive 
capabilities validated in terms of the a priori categories, thus, the system beco1nes 
capable of bootstrapping itself to further levels of grounded representation. 
We hence propose a bootstrapping approach that utilises a direct percept-action 
coupling that avoids the description process as an intermediate stage. Cognitive 
capabilities are represented as explicit models (i.e. having an explicit semantic 
n1eaning in contrast to implicit distributed knowledge at the sensorilnotor level 
[66]) that parmnetrically link elements of the percept-action do1nain. This leads 
to the develop1nent of cotnpact symbolic representations of cognitive knowledge. 
The driving n1achinery of bootstrapping is thus attaining perceptual goals by 
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action. Once a goal is detected as a salient perceptual state, the system has a 
'desire' to learn a motor solution to satisfy the goal by means of its own action 
capabilities. Such a system configuration generates an incren1ental update of 
the perceptual don1ain in terms of the detected salient states and activates ex-
ploratory 1nechanis1ns in order to generalise the corresponding n1otor solutions. 
The hierarchical bootstrapping of the grounded cognitive concepts exhibits siln-
ilarities to certain aspects of other learning techniques, such as Reinforcen1ent 
Learning or SLAJVI Robotics. However, the proposed approach demonstrates a 
significant improvernents of learning performance ( nmnely, being characterised 
by a linear increase in con1putational require1nents when learning in a typical 
unconstrained environment, as con1pared with the near-exponential increase for 
conventional percept-action learners). 
Key words: Cognitive Bootstrapping, Artificial Cognitive Syste1ns, Au-
tonomous Agents, Percept-Action Learning, Open-Ended Architectures. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Problem Statement 
Traditional approaches to Intelligent Agency have solved a nun1ber of tasks as-
sociated with recognition [26, 15, 57, 35], logical inference [42, 12, 31, 6, 54] and 
planning [11, 60, 29]. Each year the scope of possible applications for the intelli-
gent robots grows significantly with a tendency to con1pletely replicate hun1an's 
abilities in areas that require high-level cognitive skills (51, 79). 
Conventional methods of intelligent agent design rely on various techniques fo-
cusing at building control tnodels that can be sequentially executed by a systetn 
operating in the envirorunent [47]. Such systetns demonstrate well-tnodelled per-
formance and achieve a certain efficiency. In order to develop agents capable 
of sustaining autonotnous behaviour a variety of algorithtns that build up ac-
curate, usually, geometry-based tnodels of the environn1ent have been proposed 
[27, 83]. Those approaches, however, detnand significant amounts of mernory 
and computation that bring the system perfonnance far beyond the real-time re-
quirements. Attempts to utilise cotnputationally affordable (whether extremely 
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rough or highly specific) environmental representations caused further lhnitations 
of system capabilities such as failures to deal with lmpredicted changes occurring 
in the real world (see NiacDonnan [37) for n1ore details). 
An opposite view to the developn1ent of autonomous systmns assumes that the 
internal models of the environn1ent are not predefined but, instead, should be 
acquired by learning [77, 34]. This direction of research can be characterised by 
a significant nurnber of machine learning techniques applied within specific learn-
ing dornains (see Niichie [43] for an overview). A series of subsequent approaches 
aimed at developing generic, i.e. task-independent, learning rnethods being corn-
binations of existing constrained algorithms failed in their inability to reconfigure 
internal systen1 representations and to address accumulating complexity in order 
to perform progressive abstraction of acquired capabilities (39]. 
A possible solution here proposed to the problem of increasing cornplexity in au-
tonomous learning involves the idea of re-prograrnn1ing knowledge representations 
in order to eliminate any discrepancy between internal percept-action relation-
ships and the physical structure of the external world. An agent equipped with 
sin1ple representations of its perceptual and motor don1ains performs an itera-
tive self-update of its percept-action space such that at each iteration the sys-
tem perceives the environment in terms of newly obtained perceptual categories. 
Those categories are represented as compact percept-action n1odels and becon1e 
available via learning. Thus, cognitive capabilities in such systems progressively 
emerge, or bootstrap, via reorganisation of the internal percept-action rep-
resentations. The iterative self-structuring of the representations leads to the 
development of hierarchical percept-action rnodels (for an extended review of 
the percept-action approach see Section 2.1). The latter provides a theoretically 
unconstrained range of learning capabilities and, thus, the proposed learning 
14 
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framework is open-ended. 
1.2 Goal and Objectives 
The presented work is intended to investigate 1nechanisms of bootstrapping percept-
action capabilities in the forn1 of hierarchical symbolic models. Our goal is to 
overcome the n1ajor problems intrinsic to the existing n1ethods of autonon1ous 
learning, in particular the following: 
• Traditional systems integrate and maintain many different kinds of Inul-
timodal information making it explicitly available to other processes i:J;l-
cluding those of abstract reasoning [38, 9]. Such global conceptualisation 
however requires a high computational cost that creates a bottleneck for 
processing known as the framing problem [41, 56]. 
• High-level sy1nbolic 1nodels refer to externally dictated ground tnith and 
the mechanisms of reasoning cannot validate symbolic conjunctions by pro-
jecting the1n back to the environment. Thus, n1anipulating such 1nodels 
may lead to creating any, including absurd, representation. 
• Conventional approaches lack percept-action integration: perceptual and 
action representations should grow shnultaneously to avoid an explosion 
of computational resources required to solve perceptually complex learning 
scenarios. 
The objectives of the present work are identified as follows: 
15 
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1. Formalise 1nechanisms of bootstrapping cognitive capabilities within the 
percept-action fran1ework. 
2. Develop algorithms for learning individual cognitive capabilities represented 
in the form of compact parmnetric models. 
3. Propose a methodology for simultaneous updating percept-action represen-
tations such as to build a hierarchy of capabilities. 
4. Evaluate convergence characteristics of bootstrapping and perform numer-
ical co1nparison of the proposed 1nethod with other learning techniques. 
1.3 Approach 
We start with an assu1nption that bootstrapping relies on a set of innate prhnitive 
concepts that directly refer to the physical environment. Those representations 
can be considered as a priori grounded, i.e. true, cognitive hypotheses, thus, the 
bootstrap representations can be validated in respect to the external world. The 
learning n1echanism initialises exploration of the environ1nent using the existing 
'correct' categories. This process is ailned at the discovery of salient perceptual 
states, referred as perceptual goals. The exploratory behavior enables the systein 
to fonn the intention to attain those states by learning generic 1notor solutions 
that satisfy the corresponding goals. 
The ability to achieve a goal starting from any configuration of the environ1nent 
constitutes the necessary context-invariant character of the behavioural 1nodels: 
the concept of generalised action n1odels underlies the definition of symbols. Syin-
bols are abstract labels that refer to compact invariant percept-action capabilities 
acquired via learning. Symbolic representations of the environment are thus de-
16 
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veloped in tenus of the labeled percept-action co1npetences. 
Learning individual percept-action 1nodels in our problem context is considered 
as the central task of the sy1nbolic abstraction. However, the proble1n of building 
a hierarchy of capabilities is not only a question of appropriate structuring of 
the obtained percept-action models. Updated perceptual representations can be 
regarded as advanced system perceptual capabilities that, in turn, create prereq-
uisites for efficient acquisition of novel behaviours. The essence of the proposed 
bootstrapping approach is that the primitive innate perceptual capabilities and 
their respective simple perceptual goals lead to the initial organisation of the 
action space. The modified n1otor competences then re-specify the do1nain of 
perceptual parameters bringing out novel behavioural goals. Those goals can be 
reached by 1neans of the updated action n1odels much n1ore efficiently than via 
exploiting the original representation of the n1otor domain. We hence refer to 
this kind of recursive incremental self-determination of the percept-action rep-
resentations as Hierarchical Percept-Action Bootstrapping, leading to the 
development of hierarchical capabilities in the percept-action dmnain. 
1.4 Novelty and Contribution 
Our contribution to autonon1ous learning consists of two novel methods. The 
first technique realises a direct parameter 1napping between perception and ac-
tion domains. Based on specific representations of action models the proposed 
algorithm is intended to determine, through learning, motor responses by 1neans 
of parameters identified in the perceptual domain. The ability to manipulate 
actions within the space of perceptual variables is a new and almost unexplored 
contribution to the percept-action learning approach. 
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The second 1nechanism facilitates the development of a hierarchical open-ended 
structure of capabilities. It allows a significant reduction of dimensionality in the 
perceptual domain, providing the search for goal-relevant 1notor solutions with 
1nuch more compact parameter space and, thus, improving the convergence time 
of the learning tasks. 
1.5 Outline 
The thesis is organised in the following way. In the next chapter, Chapter 2, were-
view the research in Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and Cognitive Science related 
to the presented work. We consider in detail the topics of Percept-Action Ar-
chitectures [4, 20), Symbolic Intelligence [14], the Problem of Symbol Grounding 
[22] and the Theory of Affordances [18]. Finally, we discuss some co1nputational 
foundations of Cognitive Bootstrapping [33, 81]. 
Chapter 3 presents a hierarchical bootstrapping architecture that incorporates 
mechanis1ns of percept-action coupling, learning action models and developing 
representations of the symbolic structures. An algorithn1 for percept-action learn-
ing of behavioural n1odels is described in Chapter 4. We propose a 1nethod for 
the stochastic search within the space of available action capabilities such that 
the system learns to reach discovered perceptual goals in a 1nore generalised 
fashion. That generic percept-action learning is then used as a key mechanism 
for hierarchical bootstrapping of novel perceptual representations of the environ-
lnent. Exploiting the corresponding action models via the procedure of direct 
percept-action paran1eter n1apping, we develop a hierarchy of capabilities in an 
incremental open-ended way. 
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The following chapter is devoted to an application of the bootstrapping approach 
to a specific learning scenario- solving a 'shape sorter' puzzle. We setup a partic-
ular configuration of the environ1nent and carry out a theoretical analysis of the 
processes induced by the systmn's intentions to accon1plish the game. Chapter 
6 presents the results of quantitative experiments with the hnplemented systmn 
and co1npares the system perforn1ance to the conventional methods of percept-
action learning. Chapter 7 concludes the presented work and discusses further 
research perspectives in autono1nous cognition. 
19 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Survey 
2.1 Percept-Action Architectures 
The lack of success in the developn1ent of autonomous agents capable of operating 
in the real world can be attributed to an early view wherein sensor information 
is processed by perceptual modelling and recognition before becoming available 
to the 1notor d01nain (26, 61]. The perceptual 1nechanisn1s are used to build ex-
plicit 1nodels of external objects step by step as accurately as possible [24, 53]. 
Acquired detailed descriptions are then assigned to certain physical actions in 
order to produce an appropriate motor response. 
Such a centralised use of perceptual modelling does not perfonn very well for a 
nu1nber of reasons. First of all, a global conceptualisation requires high cotnputa-
tional cost: the detailed perceptual description creates a bottleneck of processing. 
Also, building representations fro1n purely perceptual information brings only 
syntactic (not semantic) constraints to the acquired models meaning that one 
can n1anipulate the descriptions to generate anything logically possible including 
a limitless nutnber of absurd concepts. 
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The philosophy underlying the percept-action approach proposes to produce di-
rect motor responses to percepts avoiding the phase of description and recogni-
tion. This 1nethod is motivated by the idea that a cognitive system primarily 
does not need a description of the external world; what it seeks is an active inter-
pretation, i.e. links between actions and corresponding states of the perceptual 
domain. To achieve such percept-action coupling it is necessary to eliminate the 
gap between the perceptual structure and the space of motor co1nmands. One 
approach, a substnnption architecture, proposed by Brooks [4], attempts to de-
velop systmns through networks of simple fully functional behaviors that perform 
mapping of sensors to actuators. The technique relies on two principles: 
• Situatedness. This criteria determines the system interaction with the real 
world, not with abstract descriptions of the sensor information, i.e. the 
environment directly influences the system behaviour. 
• Embodiment, A robot is considered as a part of the world and possesses 
capabilities to act in the environment by means of motor movements and 
to receive the response via its perceptual mechanisms. 
The main distinctive attribute of this behaviour-based approach was a co1nplete 
reconfiguration of the classical learning architecture. According to the proposed 
S'Ltbs'Ltmption principle the systen1 tasks are decomposed into a vertical structure 
of separate behavioural n1odules. The learning goal of the proposed fra1nework 
consists in coordination of the behavioural levels via competing and inhibitions. 
Systen1 skills can be improved by adding new layers on top of the existing struc-
ture. Although the systmn levels are in general considered as independent, the 
later behaviour modules may interact with the previous layers. For instance, a 
layer related with the exploratory behaviour does not involve an explicit mecha-
22 
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nisn1 for obstacle avoidance because the lower levels that possess the correspond-
ing information will take care of it. 
The subsumption architecture does not contain a central processing module or 
a central model representation. Infonnation is distributed among the states of 
the associative networks that constitute the behaviotu·allayers. The systmn be-
haviour is determined by the competition among parallel modules, hence, the 
system exhibits a reactive performance in the environment that satisfies the real-
time requirements. 
The behavioural-based robotic approach has been generalised and extended in 
the consequent research [78, 2] den1onstrating results of adaptive, autono1nous 
and goal-directed interaction between the agent and the environment. For in-
stance, the principle of tight coupling between perception and action constitutes 
a developrnental approach to cognitive learning studies at LIRA Lab [36J. This 
research group has developed an experhnental robotic platfonn, Cog, that learns 
behavioural capabilities in an incremental way. A gradual expansion of the be-
haviour domain in this system hnplied gaining novel capabilities with each novel 
behaviour being based on the previous stage of develop1nent. Thus, following the 
ideas of the subsumption architecture SandinPs group explicitly fonnulated ver-
tical aspects of the interlayer relationships. Exploiting rather shnple but generic 
n1echanisms of associative learning the demonstrated system was able to establish 
linking between perceptual properties of objects and their 1notion signatures: the 
robot learned to 1nove objects in desired directions. 
The fact that the percept-action approach completely rejects the procedures of 
acquiring high-level knowledge representations caused strong debates between 
the classical AI and behaviour-based robotic cotntnunities. It has been claimed 
that the emergent cognition, via the percept-action approach, lacks key aspects 
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of thinking, particularly, syste1naticity, productivity and inferential coherence 
[14]. The underlying n1echanis1ns in such syste1ns are not able to deal effectively 
with con1ponent structures [37]. Human thinking is systematic because if peo-
ple can understand sentence "'John loves Mary" ' they can in general understand 
structurally similar sentence '"Ivlary loves John'"; it is productive as people can 
generate an unlimited ntunber of sentences; and it is inferentially coherent as 
people fonn valid conclusions from valid premises. 
Fodor and Pylyshyn claimed that argun1ents relatively to language understand-
ing can also be applied for non-verbal perception and cognition in animals. They 
proposed two major principles underlying a sy1nbol system capable to simulate 
human thinking: 
• The syntax should encode inference of representation. 
• Iviachines can be prograrn1ned to manipulate sytnbols according to their 
internal syntax. 
The demand for symbolic cognitive representations caused the developn1ent of 
hybrid cognitive architectures (19, 8, 44, 59] atten1pting to graft the symbol sys-
tetn on top of the sensorin1otor level. A good example of the successful research 
in this direction is a percept-action robotic 1nodel proposed by Granlund [20]. 
The sensorhnotor part of this systen1 has a percept-action feedback loop as a 
central mechanisn1 of processing. The main distinction here is action preceding 
perception during the learning phase. The action space is much less complex than 
the perceptual do1nain because of the enonnous nun1ber of perceptual primitives 
that can be possibly detected in an image. The exploration of the action domain 
is used to perfonn initial structuring of the relevant part of the feature space. 
The early learning stage the system, driven by rando1n actions, observes changes 
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in the perceptual inforn1ation and determines actions that caused those changes. 
Such a learning strategy allows the systmn efficiently separate objects frmn the 
background, detect distinct parts of objects, learn how percepts transform under 
actions. Acquisition of cmnprehensive percept-action mapping also provides the 
systmn with sufficient information in order to solve an inverse learning task of 
action control by perceptual inference. 
The emergence of cognitive representations in a sy1nbolic form provides that the 
capability of interacting with the external world not only by means of physical 
actions, but also via language skills has been addressed by Harnad [23]. Here, it is 
emphasised that modelling objects and events in the external environment, even 
within the conventional robotics approaches such as 1nachine vision, locomotion, 
recognition and planning indeed requires the exploitation of abstract structures. 
Developing cognitive representations in the form of conceptual knowledge, not 
in terms of sensorhnotor associations, also relies on abstract invariant entities. 
Acquiring linguistic capabilities in order to com1nunicate with the environment 
at the high-level, sharing labels, descriptions or thoughts, directly depends on 
the syn1bolic vocabulary available to the syste1n. Thus, the next question that 
requires our consideration is the proble1n of learning cognitive capabilities as syin-
bolic representations. Most of our attention will hence be paid to establishing a 
relationship between sy1nbolic models and physical properties of the environ1nent 
that is known as the Symbol Grounding Problem [22]. 
2.2 The Symbol Grounding Problem 
An1ong other reasons explaining the Sy1nbol Grounding Problmn (SGP) the most 
distinctive exa1nple is the Chinese Room Argument introduced by Seade [58]. 
25 
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A core of the experiment consists in someone studying Chinese using only a 
Chinese-Chinese dictionary with no prior knowledge concerning the meaning of 
hieroglyphs. It is suggested that in such conditions the subject will proceed 
through an infinite search of semantic relations between new symbols and al-
ready existing concepts. Thus, the experiment demonstrates a symbol system 
that defines only itself and which is disconnected fron1 the external world and 
therefore cannot be a viable model of cognition [23). 
An extended definition of the symbol grounding problem and its solution fro1n the 
perspectives of autonon1ous learning has been fonnulated by Taddeo and Floridi 
[70). According to this formulation SGP concerns an autonomous development 
of internal symbolic semantics fro1n 'scratch' via interaction of a cognitive agent 
with its environment or other agents. The authors determined a Zero Seinan-
tic Com1nitment Condition (Z Condition) as a criteria for defining the symbol 
grounding proble1n and justifying proposed solutions. It includes three points. 
• No semantic resolu·ces are allowed in the system at the beginning. 
• No external semantics can be uploaded fron1 the outside. 
• The systmn should have its own capacities to be able to ground syn1bols. 
There has also been a clain1 that any approach that breaches Z Condition is se-
mantically committed and hence fails to solve SGP. 
The existing methods to the symbol grounding can be divided into hybrid sys-
tems [7, 66] and connectionists architectures (7 4]. The first approach atten1pts to 
ground sy1nbols in a representation obtained from perceptual information [22). 
The learning framework was designed to develop grounded sy1nbols via integrat-
ing the connectionist, i.e. artificial neural networks, to systems with classical 
26 
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mechanisms of Inanipulating symbols. The underlying idea was to establish con-
nections between symbols and the external world by bottom-up categorisation 
of sensoriinotor infonnation. Harnad distinguishes three stages of the syn1bol 
grounding process: 
• Iconisation - a transformation of the analogue perceptual signals into inter-
nal equivalents of the projections of external objects on the sensory surfaces. 
• Discrimination - a process aimed to detect invariances from the iconic in-
formation and build up perceptual categories. 
• Identification - assigning abstract labels to the categories. 
The key property of the 1nethod is the detection of invariant features on sensory 
projections used as a ground to be connected with symbolic labels. This principle 
Harnad called Categorical Perception. 
The advantage of the hybrid architecture is that it attempts to overco1ne lim-
its encountered by the connectionist and symbolic systen1s via co1nbining their 
strengths. A pure symbolic syste1n is unable to link sy1nbols to the their refer-
ents. On the other hand, although the neural networks are capable of connecting 
sy1nbols and external objects, they cannot 1nanipulate symbols since they lack 
explicit, systen1atic and finite representations. 
An infinite ntunber of possible perceptual categories that can be detected in 
complex environments can be considered as the disadvantage of the Harnad's 
approach. fvlayo (40] has proposed a functional model for syrnbol grounding with 
the category perception mechanis1n detecting only categories that provide the 
best description of the world. Perceptual categories are considered fron1 the per-
spective of their functionalities and the ability to fulfil specific actions in the 
27 
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surroundings. Thus, the 1nethod grounds sy1nbols that correspond to the se-
lected perceptual categories through action. Various behaviours can possibly 
provide different action n1eanings, in tenns of 1notor parameters, for instance, to 
the sa1ne perceptual category. Therefore, the procedure that creates the con·e-
sponding abstract perceptual concept generalises the associated actions such that 
perceptually they will be treated equally in any further stage of processing. 
The idea of grounding sy1nbols by perfonning actions has beco1ne very popu-
lar in the area of autonon1ous cognitive learning. However, in his work Nlayo 
does not consider aspects of learning novel action functionalities. It is implied 
that the systmn already possessed sufficient 1notor skills to accomplish possible 
behavioural tasks. Such an assumption, obviously, cannot be accepted for mod-
elling mechanisms of open-ended learning. 
The developn1ent of novel behavioural capabilities and corresponding represen-
tations of grounded symbolic concepts has been addressed in the work of Sun 
[68]. This approach is characterised by the intentional nature of the agent-world 
interaction. The detected perceptual categories are still considered from the 
viewpoint of action possibilities to 1nanipulate the corresponding entities of the 
environ1nent. However, the systmn objective becon1es the incremental expansion 
of the 1notor domain via learning new action 1noclels. 
The proposed learning architecture consists of two parts: the low-level percept-
action 1nodule and the high-level of generalised syn1bolic concepts. The percept-
action part uses the Q-learning algoritlun [67]. At the first stage the system 
applies available actions directly to the environ1nent in order to achieve a given 
goal. Using trial and error the learning n1echanisn1 searches for a goal-relevant 
solution using a set of restrictions and predispositions defined through sensorhno-
tor experience. The tasks addressed at the low-level consist in learning actions 
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that lead to the solution of the goal - those actions then build the initial implicit 
behavioural models. At the second stage the system generalises the acquired 
tnodels and creates explicit conceptual, i.e. symbolic, percept-action representa-
tions. 
Sun's formalisn1 was a first cotnplete model of learning action capabilities as sym-
bolic entities in a bottom-up open-ended fashion. His intentional architecture has 
been realised in the CLARION systen1 (66]. However, the existing criticistn of 
the approach argues that the learning intentionality has been predefined at both 
levels of the system [70]. The supporters of the intentional approach, conversely, 
claim that the pre-engineering is not subject to objections if one considers the 
generic mechanistns that drive learning: the existence of such processes can be 
justified by their intrinsic ability to cope with any configuration of the learning 
task. 
For living organisms such speculations can be explained by evolutionary develop-
tnent, where, over a significant nun1ber of generations, pre-cognitive tnechanisms 
have been created to provide 1nore efficient interaction with the world, in par-
ticular, those n1echanisn1s of learning high-level behavioral functionalities and 
abstract concepts. 
Other exatnples intended to solve the syn1bol grounding problem 1nainly vary ac-
cording their cotnputational platforms: connectionis1n or explicit smnantic tnod-
elling. Vogt [76] refonnulated the definition of symbols for physically embodied 
agents: a 'Physical Symbol' is a structural coupling of behavioural actions and 
perceptual categories. Thus, physical symbols are given their behavioral tnean-
ing by definition. Vogt carried out a series of experiments with two autonomous 
robots [75] in order to demonstrate a possible solution to the symbol grounding 
probletn using a guess gatne. One agent, the speaker, has the task of perceiving 
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and naming objects of the environment, another robot, the hearer, must iden-
tify and point at the objects designated by the speaker. In the course of their 
interaction the agents acquire a common alphabet of symbols that gain physical 
meaning through the processes of perception and cmnmunication. 
The approaches to learning grounded symbolic representations considered in this 
section thus rely on active interaction with the external environ1nent. At this 
stage of analysis we have discussed, albeit in implicit forn1, the method of per-
ceiving objects or events in terrns of action possibilities that can be applied to 
those world entities. Next, we will present an approach that explicitly formu-
lates the 1nechanis1n of perception as detection of object possibilities that 'afford' 
certain physical actions. 
2.3 The Affordance-Based Approach 
In psychology there exist a number of theories attempting to clarify the n1ech-
anisms of developing cognitive capabilities in anin1als and htnnans (Piaget [52], 
Gestal [5], Gibson [18] etc.). Perhaps the first approach that had e1nphasised the 
funda1nental role of action and, therefore, is of particular interest in otu· research 
is the Theory of Affordances, fonnulated by J.J.Gibson (1977-1979) which gained 
further development and fonnalisation in the studies of (49, 73, 64]. 
Thaditional approaches to the psychology of perception in the 20th century adopted 
an assumption that objects are perceived as sets of properties (color, shape etc.) 
and that those properties detennine the internal mental representation of the 
environ1nent. Gibson's idea concerns the perception of world entities from the 
viewpoint of actions that can be performed upon those entities. An organis1n 
hence perceives possibilities of interaction with the environment. The tenn af-
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fordance has been introduced by Gibson as intrinsic an property of objects in 
the world independent fro1n the perceptual capabilities of the agent. Affordances 
existing in the environn1ent are directly related with the behavioral abilities of 
the agent, for exa1nple, a plain and rigid surface affords walkability only if the 
agent can walk. Gibson validates his hypothesis using the argu1nent that 1neaning 
and spatial properties of the objects are inseparable. This speculation, however, 
contradicts with the symbolic fonn of internal representation that can be learned 
as an independent substance. The 1nechanisms of perception proposed by Gibson 
ilnply that the agent already has a disposition to perceive affordances directly in 
the envirmunent, avoiding the procedures of description and abstraction. Such 
an approach that rejects the development of the perceptual 1nodels on the basis 
of perceptual object properties is called direct perception. 
The controversial idea of direct perception caused strong debates a1nong psychol-
ogists, 1nostly, due to various treatments and 1nisunderstanding of the affordance 
concept. Despite the fact that affordances are identified as intrinsic properties 
of external objects and not related with the organisn1 itself, the possibility to 
perceive, or to 1neasure, affordances exists only in terms of the con1posite agent-
environment systetn. 
For an agent that is unable to perceive an affordance no corresponding object 
exists. However, for another system possessing 1nore advanced sensorhnotor ca-
pabilities exactly the same percepts 1nay provide behavioural n1eaning. Thus, 
the ability to perceive affordances becon1es the key to sensing the world, refer-
ring not only to the development of appropriate perceptual skills but, what is 
n1ore hnportant, also to the action con1petences that the agent possesses. If, for 
instance, a door affords the possibility to be opened then even the 1nost detailed 
perceptual description would not allow the systen1 to acquire the corresponding 
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affordance without the relevant 1notor functionalities to push the door. 
A more suitable formalisation of the concept from the viewpoint of perceiving 
and learning affordances has been proposed by Nonnan [49]. The author defines 
this notion as a fundamental perceivable property of external objects that deter-
mines possibilities to interact with this object. Thus, in the considered approach 
affordances exist only if the agent is capable to perceive then1 and, therefore, 
affordances appear to be the characteristics of the internal representation. Fur-
thermore, such a definition brings out other attributes of affordances, absolutely 
different to Gibson's point of view. In particular, affordances now depend on sen-
sorimotor experience and are determined by ten1porary behavior goals. Through 
learning novel action capabilities the system improves its abilities to perceive af-
fordances that creates prerequisites for the acquisition of further, more advanced 
behaviours. 
Gibson's affordances have become a foundation of Ecological Psychology, a scien-
tific area intended to study mechanisn1s of perceiving the external world fro1n the 
perspectives of active interaction. Experin1ental work in this direction is carried 
out, in particular, to unveil the characteristics of affordances. One of the proposed 
attributes of affordances is a ratio between various 1neasures of the environment 
and the subject. Warren [80] obtained results in which subjects perceived the 
world not in terms of environmental cues but using metrics of the body size. 
The corresponding scale ratios, called 1r proportions, appeared to be intrinsic to 
the particular configurations of the environn1ent-agent system and different for 
each affordance. It also has been de1nonstrated [50] that shnilar characteristics 
can be obtained for dynan1ic tasks such as street crossing. The scope of research 
in Ecological Psychology is restricted to studying the perception of affordances. 
However, in our research we are 1nore interested in the application of affordances 
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for other cognitive processes, particularly, for the tnechanistns of learning behav-
ioral capabilities and developing high-level conceptual knowledge. Thus, we wish 
to clarify possibilities to learn affordances. 
A detailed consideration of the principles underlying the learning of affordances 
has been carried out by E.J.Gibson [16]. The tnain idea of the proposed approach, 
called Perceptual Learning, consists in revealing distinctive invariant properties 
of objects and events and interpreting thmn as affordance specifications. This 
process takes place through active interaction between the agent and the world. 
The approach is inspired by experhnents on observation of children learning via 
exploration of the surroundings, listening, grasping and shaking. It is believed 
that such behaviour of infants leads to understanding changes in the perceptual 
infonnation as the results of undertaken actions [17]. Possibilities to generalise 
affordances in the course of cognitive processing have been addressed by Neisser 
[48]. In order to support the principle of direct perception Neisser introduced in-
variance attuned detectors. He, however, etnphasized the lack of agent's involve-
Inent in the acquisition of affordances in Gibson's forn1alisn1 - natural objects 
contain infinite number of affordances but the internal1nechanistns of cognition 
should be able to tune the perception for some of then1, for instance, via adapting 
the paratneters of the invariance detectors. 
Early attmnpts to fonnalise learning affordances varied according to their vision 
at the definition of this notion. Affordances were considered as attributes that be-
long only to the entities of the external world [73], as properties of the agent-world 
syste1n (65] or as relations between the agent and the world (10]. The most generic 
fonn representing affordances is proposed by Sahin (55] in order to investigate 
possibilities of developing an affordance-based robotic architecture. In this ap-
proach affordances are assumed to involve three key components: environtnental 
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entity, behaviour and effect. Affordances are detected via establishing relation-
ships between entities of the environment and effects of the behavioral activities. 
However, it is also hnplied that the system already possesses a pre-defined set 
of action capabilities to interact with the world. The proposed mechanis1n of 
perceiving affordances proceeds only within the domain of available behaviors 
that, in turn, brings limitations to the range of possible affordances to be ac-
quired. IVIoreover, the inbuilt action capabilities as the result of a deep designer 
involvement restrict the learning flexibility and the abilities to operate in co1nplex 
unpredictable environments. 
An approach ai1ned to overcome the considered limitations has been proposed by 
Steedmann [63]. Instead of emphasizing the perceptual aspects of affordances, 
this method has the intention to learn the corresponding behavioral representa-
tions. The agent reveals the behavioral functionalities that are relevant to one 
or another perceptual invariant. Thus, Steedmann reformulated the problem of 
learning affordances such that the main objective of the cognitive systmn beco1nes 
learning novel behavioral capabilities. This approach hence exhibits a substantial 
sin1ilarity to the n1odels of cognitive learning proposed in this thesis. 
2.4 Cognitive Bootstrapping 
The discussed affordance-based approaches to n1odelling autono1nous behaviour 
rest on well understood 1nodels and exhibit certain advantages in co1nparison with 
centralised sequential robotic architectures. The learning mechanisms of those 
systems are pre-determined in advance by the builder. Therefore, the agent de-
velops its goals and competences on the basis of externally-imposed criteria of 
success. F\1rthermore, the obtained models are frequently controlled by a priori 
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specified descriptions of the environ1nent. 
'Truly' autonomous systmns should demonstrate properties of self-detennination 
leading to the e1nergence of high-level intelligent capacities to perceive and act 
in the external world. In artificial cognition such systen1 properties can be iln-
plemented through the develop1nent of 1nechanis1ns that re-program the internal 
control models. Con1mencing at the level of simple, originally-specified percept-
action code, the artificial agent redefines its representations and incre1nentally 
builds up further cognitive abilities. 
Self-program1ning cognition, at first glance, see1ns paradoxical. However, it can 
be considered as a generalised version of the well known 1nethod of computa-
tional bootstrapping whereby, for instance, a co1npiler for a new programn1ing 
language is written within the same language. The necessary requirmnent here 
is that the core tenus of the new language must rest on a pre-existing (a priori) 
computational-linguistic foundation, even if the final forn1 of the compiled lan-
guage retains no explicit trace of its origins [82]. 
Bootstrapping 1nay cause certain associations with statistical n1ethods of unsu-
pervised learning, however, a direct analogy is not applicable here. Unsupervised 
learning relies on explaining sensorin1otor information in terms of classification of 
gained knowledge. Further validation of this interpretation can be carried out in 
the light of new data acquired on the basis of the current categories. Unsupervised 
cognitive learning thus rests on the externally defined perceptual classes that are 
treated as systen1's own ground truth. Cognitive bootstrapping, in contrast, con-
siders obtained representations only as the nearest current approximation to the 
ground truth and proceeds through the update of cognitive n1odels on the basis 
of the existing ungrounded representations. 
The underlying paradox of bootstrapped cognition is resolved by introducing an 
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initial set of low-level cognitive categories that are 'correct' a priori. We refer 
them as to representative categories. Novel high-level concepts are constructed 
as hypothesised conjunctions of the grounded categories and can be validated 
via projecting their assumptions back to the physical environment. This process 
is hence shnilar to obtaining primary hypothesis and their further refinmnent 
through the building of navigation n1aps in optical SLA:rvi robotics [71]. Here the 
a priori correct perceptual category is haptic contact, which has the capacity to 
unambiguously validate a constituted visual representation of the environment. 
However, in our case the potential forms of representation are open-ended. 
Cognitive bootstrapping also exhibits analogues to the mechanisn1s of semantic 
learning revealed at early stages of child development. A sufficient set of words 
and their meanings is obtained first in order to generate further requests about 
1neaning of new words. The set of initial words is directly linked with perceptual 
correlations and the development of language capabilities relies on the internal 
n1echanis1n of formulating and testing representational hypotheses. 
Cognitive bootstrapping provides an autonotnous agent with capabilities to 
adapt to the environtnent via creating effective, open-ended models of perception 
and action. High-level concepts accumulate cotnplexity frmn the basic grounded 
cognitive categories. The underlying processes of bootstrapping are generalisa-
tion, induction and decision tnaking that reformulate the initial assumptions from 
the perspectives of novel sensor data. 
The bootstrapping approach has been applied for a variety of methods of au-
tonomous learning. Kuipers (32], for instance, considered bootstrap learning 
within a specific domain of learning foundations of spatial knowledge. Arguing 
that spatial knowledge is the most fundatnental among other aspects of cotn-
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1nonsense knowledge, the investigation was carried out to obtain an ontology of 
states, places, objects and actions. The learning scenario was specified such that 
the agent comn1encing at the level of uninterpreted sensors and actuators, the 
so-called pixel-level, bootstraps itself up to a certain stage of high-level spatial 
representations. At the early stages of learning the agent e1nploys not a single 
learning algorith1n but a lattice of simple but general learning methods. That 
creates prerequisites for exploiting powerful and more specific mechanisms for 
further learning leading to a hierarchy of spatial knowledge known as the Spatial 
Smnantic Hierarchy (SSH). 
Within this approach the agent performs initial structuring of its sensor and 
action domains using Self-Organising 1\!Iaps (SOM), it learns an effective hill-
climbing procedure to define distinctive states in terms of the elements in the 
updated perceptual space and deploys a trajectory-following strategy to move 
between the distinctive states. The system combines unsupervised learning, map 
learning and supervised learning to recognise places and 1nakes initial steps to-
wards bootstrap solution for reliable object individualisation and building an 
object ontology. Developing the hierarchy of spatial knowledge, also known as a 
cognitive map, follows an assumption of incremental progressive development of 
grounded spatial models, i.e. each next level of SSH is based on the lower simpler 
stages. 
Weng (81] proposes a self-aware, self-effective approach to autonomous cognition. 
The main distinction of this approach is that in addition to sensing and reacting 
capabilities the system includes internal percepts and effectors that do not result 
in physical actions. The agent trains by considering various action alternatives 
and their possible effects, i.e. it models decision rules via validating the1n within 
the internal sensor and action spaces. A 1nobile robot, SAIL, hnplements a hierar-
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chical pyramidal structure of percept-action representations with the upper levels 
supervising the lower layers in the hierarchy. It is possible, however, to chain pre-
viously established pre-attentive response n1odels in order to form con1plex and 
novel behaviours. The system hence bootstraps high-level cognitive categories 
fron1 the initial world representations that had no goal-relevant aspects. Within 
this approach goals are dictated only at the high attentive level in response to 
certain environmental conditions. 
As mentioned earlier another example of the cognitive bootstrapping approach 
which however applies to the restricted dotnain of cognitive capabilities is Sitnul-
taneous Localisation and l\!Iapping (SLAl\II). In this research area the initial task 
formulation already contains a paradoxical situation: a mobile agent attempts to 
detern1ine its location using a navigation map while, simultaneously, building and 
refining this map that, in turn, requires accurate location infonnation. The most 
successful approaches to SLAl\II etnploy Bayesian inference [72, 46, 13, 28]. A 
robotic system develops its explicit spatial environmentaltnodels via incremental 
update of the internal representations such that the localisation can be refined in 
terms of the renewed navigation maps. The bootstrap related issue in this field 
is providing perceptual classes that have the status of a priori truth. The initial 
visual classes are used as default bootstrap hypotheses and should be sufficient to 
enable validation of novel perceptual patterns and achieve grounded, i.e. correct, 
levels of navigation representations. 
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Summary 
In this chapter we have analysed several approaches to 1nodelling artificial cog-
nition. vVe have attempted to provide scientific support for the bootstrapping 
approach that will enable evaluation of its potential to solve the discussed prob-
leins of artificial cognition. It is apparent that despite the considerable efforts 
intended to iinplmnent cognitive bootstrapping in autonomous agency, there is 
a lack of methodological work. The existing 1nethods deal with constrained sce-
narios wherein cognitive agents are disposed to learn predefined kinds of repre-
sentations. However, the most distinctive attribute of en1ergent cognition is the 
possibility to deal with autonomous enviro1unents has not been significantly ad-
dressed. Thus, in the following chapter we atte1npt to develop a bootstrapping 
architecture applied to learning cognitive representations within an unconstrained 
learning do1nain. 
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Chapter 3 
The Hierarchical Bootstrapping 
Architecture 
In this chapter we address the proble1n of developing a system fra1nework that sus-
tains cognitive bootstrapping. Having established the scientific background of the 
bootstrapping approach we here define fundamental properties of the bootstrap-
ping architecture. We introduce the percept-action cycle as a central processing 
loop. Cognitive capabilities are fonnalised in terms of co1npact parametric quasi-
stationary subsets emerging in the percept-action dotnain throughout learning. 
It is shown that such para1neter co1npression can lead to a hierarchy of compact 
representations. 
3.1 Methodological Foundations 
It is apparent from our earlier analysis that 1nodelling cognition implies cer-
tain 1nethodological assumptions concerning underlying, say pre-cognitive, tnech-
anisms of learning. We cannot simply collate raw sensor data and hope to infer 
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high-level cognitive representations, for exa1nple, because of the enonnous di-
Inensionality of the task domain. We need to formulate minimal requirements 
for a cognitive system sufficient to initialise bootstrapping. Surnmarising the 
principles that constitute the bootstrap solution in artificial cognition discussed 
in Section 2.4 we here list the necessary formal provisions for the bootstrapping 
architecture: 
• The Generalising Property. The major requiretnent for the learning 
n1echanisn1 of bootstrapping is generality. Conventional approaches [3, 33) 
suggest to use a lattice of shnple and generic learners instead of a sin-
gle but con1plex and task-constrained procedlu·e; however, according to 
Kuipers there is still a possibility for shnple 1nechanisn1s of learning to cre-
ate prerequisites for more powerful methods such as Reinforcement Learning 
[69, 1, 25] or Unsupervised Learning [84, 21]. Our vision is that powerful 
learning 1nodules are not necessarily problmn-specific and a good candidate 
here is the percept-action cycle that operates within explicit representations 
of the sensor and motor dotnains 1. 
• A Priori Hypotheses. Cognitive bootstrapping commences with a set 
of inbuilt hypotheses that directly refer to properties of the physical en-
vironinent. Further levels of representation are built upon these a priori 
ground-truths and can be validated via projecting them back into the world 
for exploratory testing. For exa1nple, innate abilities to perceive visual 
scenes as sets of attractors, with certain positions and shape descriptors, 
n1ay later lead to the development of the concepts such as objects and 
1The percept-action cycle as a central learning mechanism has been proposed by [20] to 
proceed within a space of distributed sensorimotor representations. 
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holes. Despite the abstract format, those concepts still can be validated via 
learning corresponding action capabilities to 1nove objects and to fill holes. 
• Hierarchical Structuring. Another in1portant requirement for learning 
abstract high-level concepts attached to the physical world is the ability 
to develop hierarchical representations. Such structuring allows the inter-
pretation of the emerging concepts with respect to the physical properties 
at any level of abstraction through the intermediate stages of the hierar-
chy. Thus, hierarchical structuring beco1nes a key attribute of open-ended 
learning architectures. 
• Physical Constraints. This property detennines the existence of a struc-
tured physical environment or a virtual world that can be perceived, al-
though in a primitive way, using innate sensor categories. The structural 
limitations of the world should result in the acquisition of crucial cognitive 
representations at further levels of bootstrapping. 
• Capacity for Random Behaviour. In the absence of any structured be-
havioral functionalities at the low syste1n level this facility initialises boot-
strapping by performing random exploration of the environ1nent. Also, 
randon1 interaction with the world plays an important role in the course 
of acquiring n1otor control solutions associated with emerging perceptual 
categories. 
• Similarity Measure. In order to bootstrap novel sensorin1otor categories 
the system should have the ability to measure shnilarity (difference) be-
tween the states in the perceptual and action domains. Hence, we introduce 
a generic distance measure to evaluate differences between the current per-
ceptual states and the perceptual goals as action states will be represented 
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in terms of perceptual states. This measure will be used by the mechanism 
for learning generalised motor solutions (see the next bullet point). 
• Intentionality. We consider this characteristic as a driving n1echanis1n 
of bootstrapping that progressively moves the systmn through the process 
of acquiring Inore complex cognitive capabilities. Addressing this aspect 
in terms of behavioral goals the systmn 'desires' to reach certain states by 
means of its own motor functionalities. vVithin the bootstrapping archi-
tecture we propose two processes that establish intentionality: discovering 
perceptual goals and 1ninhnising the goal distance. For example, we will 
demonstrate situations where the random exploratory behavior becomes 
intentional once the system has acquired a goal. 
Next, we define three principal n1echanis1ns that constitute our bootstrapping 
architecture and satisfy the bootstrap requirements discussed above. 
1. Percept-Action Cycle. 
This module implmnents the iterative linking of the perception and action 
dynamic paran1eter spaces. The original structuring of the percept-action 
domain is such that the system perceives the scene in tenns of shnple per-
ceptual features - a priori perceptual categories, and it is only capable of 
generating random motor co1n1nands. If the initial perceptual capabilities 
are sufficient to discover novel perceptual goals then the randon1 behaviour 
becmnes intentional due to the process of learning the corresponding novel 
action models. The percept-action cycle is thus the key mechanis1n of boot-
strapping that enables the incren1ental update of the percept-action para-
Inetric representations. 
2. Parametric Compression Mechanism. 
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The parameteric compression 1nechanisn1s is used to develop compact context-
invariant percept-action representations. The process is based on the de-
tection of invariant subspaces in the perceptual domain and their further 
labelling by novel goal parameters. The action space is updated by 1neans of 
the generalised 1notor solutions that satisfy the detected perceptual goals. 
3. Feedback Loop. 
The top-down feedback fro1n the do1nain of hierarchical cognitive capabil-
ities to the level of the current percept-action representations enables the 
agent to utilise its learning experience. At any stage of learning the sys-
tem has access to the previously acquired behavioural capabilities, thus, 
the novel action 1nodels can be constructed using the existing abstract 
percept-action categories. For example, in order to learn the solution of 
the shape-sorter puzzle game, the systmn, instead of performing a randon1 
search for appropriate actions, should exploit the capabilities of grasping 
objects or filling holes acquired at the earlier stages of learning. 
In the consequent development we will proceed to a 1nore detailed specification 
of the proposed key n1echanis1ns. 
3.2 Percept-Action Coupling 
The majority of classical robotic architectures have a central processing sequence 
that con1posed off three stages: perception/description/action (Figure 3.1). In 
Chapter 2 we already discussed the arguments criticising this traditional ap-
proach for its lack of autonomy and flexibility, high computational requiretnents 
and inability to cope with unpredictable changes of the real world. vVe have 
also considered an alternative solution to the cognitive architecture design that 
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Figure 3.1: The classical robotic archite ture and its percept-action alternative. 
Th description procedure is removed from the intermediate stage and placed on 
top of the percept-action cycle. 
liminates the process of description an intermediate tage and hence dir ctly 
links perception and action. Originally, this approach was considered within a 
neural-network (or conn ctionist) ideology that establi he sensorimotor coupling 
by means of tuning weights of associative networks. Such knowledge repre enta-
tions appear to be strictly distribut d. The underlying philosophy of thi method 
does not refer to any explicit semantic meaning of acquir d representation and 
completely reject any form of abstract symbolic knowledge. The con equent at-
tempts to utilise the connectioni t architectures follow the idea of integrating the 
distributed knowledge and symbolic representations. In such hybrid sy terns the 
information at the level of sensorimotor linking is tran formed into a symbolic 
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form 2 . However, the existing 1nethods n1ostly rely on pre-defined links between 
sensorimotor states and sytnbols: the symbol system generates arbitrary labels 
that are attached to the detected patterns of the network states. Attempts to 
generate sytnbols autotnatically via top-down linking with the sensorhnotor in-
formation result in the development of ungrounded abstract entities. Further 
manipulations within the space of the syn1bolic tokens that are not attached to 
the physical environn1ent can then lead to the emergence of abstu·d concepts, 
even if the consequent structuring of the sytnbolic don1ain is performed in a hi-
erarchical fashion. 
3.3 Parametric Compression 
vVe define cognitive capabilities as links atnong invariant subspaces that emerge 
within the percept-action paratneter domains throughout learning (Figure 3.2). 
Hierarchical structuring of capabilities asstunes that various levels in the hierar-
chy can be associated with different representations of the percept-action spaces. 
The mechanistn of percept-action paratneter update rests on the detection of 
quasi-stable subclasses a1nong the corresponding sensorilnotor representations. 
The perceptual domain is re-indexed in terms of the distinctive invariant pa-
rarneter units, referred as perceptual goals; the motor domain is upgraded using 
generalised motor responses acting in the environn1ent so as to achieve the corre-
sponding goal. By 'generalised 1notor solution' we term an action capability for 
attaining the goal frotn any configuration of the environn1ent (within a range of 
2This problem is also known as abstracting sensorimotor knowledge into explicit symbolic 
models, [20]. 
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Figure 3.2: The bootstrapping architecture employs the sen orimotor cycle to 
create explicit percept-action models. The aim of learning individual competenc s 
is the acquisition of parametric percept-action linking. The learned models in 
turn update the percept-action representations in terms of discovered perceptual 
goal states and novel action capabilities. 
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configurations where such a solution is physically possible). Thus, the percept-
action, i.e. cognitive capabilities can be considered as conjunctions of perceptual 
goal categories and invariant action sequences. The corresponding percept-action 
representations updated in terms of novel capabilities constitute the ｰ｡ｲ｡ｭ･ｴｲｩｾ＠
basis for further levels of learning. 
The open-ended learning architecture assumes that cognitive capabilities should 
have a unified form of representation. Hence, in our approach we formalise the 
individual percept-action capabilities as functions of parametric argu1nents such 
that the returned action sequences achieve corresponding goals (see Chapter 4 
for further details). 
3.4 Hierarchical Structuring of Capabilities 
As we mentioned above, the develop1nent of hierarchical cognitive capabilities 
is based on the feedback between the don1ain of structured representations and 
the level of sensorin1otor linking. The exploration of the environment using the 
acquired percept-action capabilities leads to the detection of new invariant per-
ceptual subspaces. The corresponding perceptual goals, apparently, possess a 
higher level of complexity and abstraction as con1pared with the initial stages of 
learning. Shnilarly, the novel action co1npetences exhibit 1nuch faster learning 
convergence than any other 1notor solution obtained by 1neans of the prilnitive 
innate actions (see experimental results in Chapter 6). 
A general structure of the dmnain of learned capabilities is shown in Figure 3.3. 
Different levels of abstraction 1nay contain several representations that correspond 
to cases where exactly the same set of action capabilities produces solutions for 
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various goals. This graph emphasises the principal difference between the no-
tions of representation and capability: a representation is a level of parametric 
structuring of the percept-action spaces whereas a capability is partic'ltlar linkage 
between parameter subsets in the perceptual and motor domains. 
The possibility of learning n1ultiple capabilities at different levels of represen-
tation 1nakes the hierarchy open-ended, not a converging pyra1nidal structure. 
That largely elhninates any influence of a priori categories and competences on 
the kind of capabilities obtained at the higher levels. Thus, the systen1 overco1nes 
the restrictions on the range of possible learning tasks it can address even if the 
original set of co1npetences contains extrmnely simple capabilities. 
Summary 
In this chapter a hierarchical bootstrapping architecture has been presented. 
First, we formulated 1nethodological require1nents necessary for the develop1nent 
of the bootstrapping systmn. Next, three Inechanisins, namely, the percept-action 
cycle, the parameter cmnpression procedure and the feedback loop, were specified 
as key components of the systmn ｦｲ｡ｾｮ･ｷｯｲｫＮ＠ In the following sections we out-
lined each of those n1odules separately and discussed the ideas concerning their 
possible hnplmnentations within the systmn prototype. 
In Chapter 4 we will introduce an algorithm for percept-action learning of the 
individual cognitive capabilities. The discussion will be devoted to accu1nulating 
perceptual experience for the automatic goal detection. We will also dmnonstrate 
how actions (or action sequences) relevant to goals can be generated via stochas-
tic instantiations of available n1otor capabilities. However, the most important 
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ARCHITECTURE 
Levels of Representation 
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Perception-Action 
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.. ---------------------- ......... ----------- _, 
Cognitive Capabilities 
Figure 3.3: The hierarchical organisation of cognitive r presentation . Each level 
is grounded with a priori per eptual concept via the corr ponding interm diate 
l vels. 
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part of our consideration will be dedicated to the 1nethod of acquiring novel ca-
pabilities and their generalisation. 
52 
Chapter 4 
Learning Cognitive Capabilities 
In this chapter we present a methodology of Generalised Percept-Action Learning. 
We start with a consideration of the percept-action learning fratnework. The key 
stages of the proposed learning mechanistn including the detection of behavioural 
goals and acquisition of prhnitive action tnodels are analysed in the subsequent 
sections. However, tnost of our attention is concentrated on a generalising pro-
cedure that underlies the developtnent of novel percept-action capabilities. The 
proposed learning tnethod progressively updates parametric representations in 
the percept-action space that leads to an open-ended structure of hierarchical 
cognitive skills. 
4.1 Overview of the Percept-Action Framework 
The hierarchical percept-action part of the system involves two principal inde-
pendent processes: the automatic discovery of perceptual goals and learning to 
achieve the detected goals by action. The entire n1echanis1n of learning motor 
solutions for the perceptual goals can be represented as a processing sequence 
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where each cascade is a separate percept-action cycle (Figure 4.1). The first pro-
cedure generates actions via rando1n instantiation of motor sequences expressed 
in terms of the existing action vocabulary. It analyses the perceptual feedback 
and 1nakes a decision on a motor sequence that satisfies the goal (i.e. such se-
quence instantiation minhnises the distance between the current perceptual state 
and the goal 1). 
A random search within the domain of motor capabilities rarely follows the opti-
Inal path to the goal. This process may involve instantiation of actions that are 
not relevant to the desired syste1n behaviour. The second stage of processing is 
thus ahned at elhninating redundant action elements from the motor sequence 
involved in achieving the goal. This algorith1n returns n1ore co1npact and, there-
fore, n1ore optimal representation of the initial action model. 
An internal representation of the action capabilities is then introduced as a func-
tion of motor parameters that instantiate particular 1notor states. As we will see 
below, a 'successful' solution of a behavioural task 1nay correspond to an action 
sequence containing parameters whose values are constant for any arrangement 
of objects in the environment. In order to detect those constant parameters the 
system proceeds to a series of exploratory experin1ents attempting to attain the 
same goal from various initial states of the perceptual domain. 
Bootstrapping hierarchical capabilities has as its objective to learn independent 
action 1nodels that are not shnply the combinations of the existing functionalities. 
To obtain such representations we propose an algorithm for generalising 1notor 
para1neters. Initially, all non-constant parmneters of the action sequence are rep-
resented as a novel generalised parameter vector. The systmn then perfonns a 
1 In the next section we will formalise the behavioural goal as a perceptual state and introduce 
the concept of a generalised goal distance. 
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series of exploratory movements in order to detennine a range of possible percep-
tual states that correspond to the achieved goal. Finally, the algorithm attmnpts 
to index those states by a minimal number of variables that, in ttu·n, replace the 
co1nponents of the existing generalised paratneter vector, i.e. the indices that 
label the perceptual states at the stage of the achieved goal becon1e the novel 
motor parameters. As we will see later such re-paran1eterisation frequently leads 
to significant reduction of the parameter search space and considerably improves 
convergence of the learning 1nechanisn1. 
The rest of this chapter presents a detailed forn1alisation of the percept-action 
learning fra1nework. The next question to be addressed is thus the discovery of 
perceptual goals. 
4.2 Discovering Perceptual Goals 
4.2.1 'Saliency' Detection 
In the methodological foundation section we have forn1ulated the task of auto-
matic goal discovery as a driving 1nechanisn1 of learning. Thus, a criterion that 
identifies certain structures of perceptual features as perceptual goals should rest 
on reliable and generic 1nechanis1ns, such as 'saliency' detection. The nlecha-
nism of saliency detection is based on gathering silnple statistics in the space 
of perceptual features and searching for distinctive peaks in the corresponding 
distributions. This approach to goal detection can be validated fro1n an objec-
tive viewpoint of general physical events taking place in the environment. For 
instance, the existence of the gravitational force is 1nanifested in the phenomenon 
that the majority of the external objects 1nove only along the horizontal or verti-
cal lines. Those highly salient 1novement directions can be detected via evaluation 
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of the perceptual feature frequencies over a series of observations. Formulated in 
tern1s of perceptual goals those events may initialise learning to 1nove the robot 
1nanipulator along the dedicated directions. Gaining such motor skills n1akes the 
system capable of attaining any position in the scene n1uch more efficiently than 
via performing rando1n n1ovetnents. 
The principles of saliency detection can also be related to children's cognitive 
learning at the early stages of development. Initially, the cognitive learning is 
supervised, oriented to the acquisition of prhnitive capabilities via repetitions of 
desired behaviours that are instrun1ental in the detection of salient goals. The 
teacher's objective is to demonstrate the relationships an1ong actions and per-
ceptual changes in the external envirotunent. The behaviours corresponding to 
the acquired perceptual goals build a vocabulary of 'shnple functionalities'. At 
further stages of learning there is an increasing likelihood of novel goals that 
cannot be attained by 1neans of the existing tnotor skills. The system should 
autonmnously proceed to a solution which 1nay involve not just a single but a 
whole branch of etnerging behaviours. The systen1 thus perforn1s exploration of 
the environtnent leading to the development of 'con1plex functionalities'. 
4.2.2 Perceptual Feature Histograms 
The proposed algorith1n of goal discovery is based on the identification of don1i-
nant modes in Feat'llre Freq1.tency Histograms (FFHs). FFHs are accun1ulated by 
integrating features perceived by the systen1 over a sequence of percept-action 
cycles. Suppose that in the perceptual dotnain the scene can be represented as a 
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vector of features f = (!1, ... , !s)· Then, for any fs, its FFH I(fs) is: 
(4.1) 
where fiJ is the jth con1ponent of ith perceptual vector; n(i) is the nutnber of 
features detected in ith scene, N is the nun1ber of iterations. 
As a simple example illustrating the calculation of FFHs let us consider the 
following configuration of the agent-environtnent systmn. Let the environn1ent 
be represented by a 2D scene restricted by squared boundaries (Figure 4. 2). 
The systen1 is capable of moving its 1nanipulator within the boundaries. At 
the same thne the physical properties of the envirotunent are such that in case of 
collision with the border the manipulator perfonns a sliding movmnent along the 
constricting boundary. The innate 1notor skills only include randmn 1novements. 
The scene in the perceptual space is represented as a four cmnponent vector of 
features: two Cartesian coordinates of the actuator target position (x, y) and two 
variations ＨｾｸＬ＠ ｾｹＩ＠ of the actuator position caused by the 1nanipulator 1novement 
f = (x, y, 6..x, ｾｹＩＮ＠ (4.2) 
The results of calculating FFHs for each component of f after a sufficient number 
of randotn exploratory n1ovements are presented on Figure 4.2. In total one can 
observe eight salient peaks in the histogratns; four 1naxhna for the actuator posi-
tion, four for the actuator movmnent. Histograms Ix, Iy exhibit high frequencies 
of the actuator positions along the border. The peaks related with the variations 
of the actuator positions, histogratns I 6..x and I 6..y, indicate the dotninant tnove-
tnents of the 1nanipulator up, down, left and right. 
The main outcome of this exatnple is that even in such primitive configura-
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Figure 4.2: An Example of Saliency Detection. Simple environmental config-
uration provides a number of perceptual goals in the form of distinctive FFH 
peaks. 
tion of the environment the system gives rise to a significant range of behavioral 
goals. The scenario offers a possibility to expand the ystem's capabilitie from 
purely random movements up to the level of controlled horizontal and vertical 
movements and also those aimed at reaching the boundaries of the s ene. The 
gained action capabilities constitute motor prerequisites for the development of 
abstract concepts such as environment's boundary in the perceptual domain. 
The mechanism of creating perceptual concepts will be considered in subsequent 
sections. 
It is important to note that the given example should not be considered as a rep-
resentative case taking pla e in the real world. We only intend to demonstrate the 
case where primitive ensorimotor capabilities are sufficient to initialis the pro-
cess of bootstrapping. A it will be shown in further experiments the algorithm 
of goal discovery does not require significant computational resources even for the 
reasonably complex configurations of the environment. It exhibits a considerably 
faster convergence than the procedure of the random motor search. 
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4.2.3 Representation of Behavioural Goals 
The next question that requires our attention is the 1nanner of representing the 
behavioural goals in the do1nain of internal syste1n parameters. We regard goals 
as states identified by distinctive FFH peaks in the perceptual space. Thus, goals 
can be considered as vectors of perceptual features associated with FFH peaks 
that exceed a threshold. At the stage of learning the prilnitive percept-action 
capabilities the saliency threshold should be applied to absolute values of FFH 
peaks, otherwise, the first randon1 moven1ent can cause the detection of randon1 
perceptual features considered as a goal. At further stages of bootstrapping the 
histogram peaks are normalised by the maximal value enabling the system to 
select the most do1ninant perceptual goals. In our experhnents we choose mn-
pirical values of the saliency threshold, however, within the shape-sorter learning 
scenario there is no distinctive correlation between the value of the threshold and 
the sequence of the perceptual goals discovered. 
A perceptual scene represented by vector f n1ay contain goal-relevant features 
termed as goal parameters 2 , other components of f that do not participate in 
the definition of the goal are referred as to contextual parameters: they represent 
the current arrangement of physical entities in the scene. The contextual pararn-
eters change their values from one scene to another whereas the goal parmneters 
demonstrate quasi-stability, i.e. their values should keep constant for a consid-
m·able range of scene configurations. The goal parameters play a central role in 
acquiring 1notor solutions, generalising action 1nodels and developing perceptual 
concepts for the sensory stimuli introduced by the perceived world. 
2For the goal-directed intelligent systems the goal features are assumed to be detected for 
any perceptual vector. 
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4.2.4 The Goal Distance 
The representation of behavioural goals as vectors of distinctive perceptual states 
leads to the following formalisation of the perceptual distance between the current 
scene and the goal state. Suppose that the perceptual goal is the vector g = 
(if, ... , iff) and the current scene contains both the goal para1neters, (Jf, ... , Je), 
and the contextual paran1eters, (fv+l' ... , is): 
f = (/f, · · · 'J;, fv+l, · · · 'fs)· 
Thereby, distance D(g, f) between the goal g and the current scene f is the 
following 1neasure: 
u 
D(g, f)= 'i:)if- ff) 2 . (4.3) 
i=l 
The introduced goal distance has two principal properties: 
• D is a Euclidean 1netric 1neasure. Such a property can be justified by 
the fact that gaining percept-action skills is ahned towards learning spatial 
knowledge [45), hence, the corresponding internal representations should be 
developed in tenns of 1netric descriptions. 
• The goal-specific features used to evaluateD makes this n1easure (and the 
whole process of learning novel action capabilities) invariant to the per-
ceptual context. However, the goal distance does depend on the stage of 
learning. 
The properties of perceptual goals and the perceptual distance measure rely on 
generic principles of gathering statistics in the perceptual space. The process of 
goal detection is hence sufficiently robust. 
The perceptual space is discontinuous. This fact leads to the question: do we 
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have the right to use the Euclidean distance in the perceptual space? The answer 
is yes if we assun1e that locally the perceptual space is still continuous. The 
distance function has been introduced to 1neasure the difference between the cur-
rent and goal states when attmnpting to generalise the n1otor solution. Such a 
solution will exist only for the perceptual states that are very close, in the global 
scale, to the goal state. Otherwise, physical properties of the environment will 
not allow the syste1n to attain the goal. As an example of the local (continuous) 
goal distance we can consider the difference between two object positions and 
orientations. A discontinuous perceptual distance 1night be caused by arbitrary 
variations in perceptual parameters (potentially of several orders of magnitude) 
for relatively sn1all motor inputs, for instance in the case of complex articulated 
objects or widespread occlusion. However, these are explicitly excluded in the 
context of our task. 
In further considerations we will den1onstrate a procedure that updates the repre-
sentation of the perceptual space in tenns of the novel goal parameters. Thus, the 
exploratory behaviour ailned at the discovery of novel goals in the environ1nent 
leads to the en1ergence of corresponding novel perceptual concepts. The evalua-
tion of the goal distance in the space of updated perceptual representations, in 
turn, hnproves the syste1n's capabilities to co1npare perceptual scenes. In this 
respect, the system learns the goal distance in order to perfonn optimal process-
ing of the gained representations. It provides a bootstrapping 1nechanism that 
enables learning novel cognitive skills with a significant effect on the convergence 
of the learning tasks. 
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4.3 Developing a Primitive Behavioral Model 
As soon as a perceptual goal has been discovered the agent follows its internal 
drive to reach it by 1neans of its own 1notor capabilities. The overall process aims 
to learn a generalised action model, i.e. a n1otor solution that satisfies the goals 
for a significant range of different physical configurations in the environ1nent. 
Expressed in terms of the goal distance the learning task is to minin1ise D. The 
process is based on a random search within the domain of available motor capabil-
ities and involves instantiating actions via generated n1otor sthnuli. As 1nentioned 
above, the bootstrapping approach is intended to incren1entally develop an open-
ended structure of behavioral capabilities, thus, the range of the available actions 
in the n1otor dmnain is detennined by the stage of learning and the learning 
scenario. Initially it involves only the abilities to generate randon11novements of 
the n1anipulator that induce more intentional movements and eventually lead to 
con1plex behavioral acts. 
The 1notor don1ain of the percept-action learner is represented as a generic set 
of existing action 1nodels { Ci} which is continuously augn1ented by learning. We 
define each action model as a function of a motor para1neter vector p: Ci = 'l/J.i (p). 
Each state of the motor parameter vector unan1biguously detennines the state of 
the physical1notors. However, we define the 1notor parameters as elen1ents of the 
perceptual space. Thus, in order to control behavioural responses via nlanipula-
tions within the perceptual do1nain the syste1n needs to learn 1napping between 
the perceptual and motor para1neter states. This process is initialised by the 
acquisition of the primitive action n1odel. The representation of the prin1itive 
action model is a randmn sequential instantiation of the existing actions with 
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specific values of the corresponding motor parameters 3 . 
An hnportant probletn arising when randon1ly searching for a n1otor solution is 
that the minimisation of the goal distance deals with a considerably vast search 
space of possible realisations of behavioural acts. It is caused 1nainly by the high 
din1ensionality of the motor parmneter space. However, the issue of detennining 
a correct order in the action sequence also requires a significant computational 
cost. For instance, in the task of grasping an object the necessary action sequence 
is m,oving the manipulator to the object ---+ grasping the object -4 moving the ma-
nipttlator again-4releasing the object. Obviously, a sequence with any other order 
of actions, even, having the smne content of action elements, will not succeed with 
the task. 
As a result there are two proble1natic behaviours of the goal distance as a function 
of action: 
1. Plateau. In this case the generated n1otor sequence does not change the 
magnitude of D. The system should 1nake a ntunber of further trials to 
produce a sequence that leads to a descending gradient of the goal distance. 
2. Local minima. This vm·iant takes place when the generated sequence 
cannot overcmne a potential barrier in the goal distance function, i.e. the 
first part of the 1notor sequence drives the goal distance to a local nlini-
Inuin, with the subsequent action elements inducing an increase of D (or 
the distance function becon1es flat as in the previous case). This situation 
is intrinsic to learning tasks with obstructions (such scenarios, involving in-
terfering events will be considered in the experhnents). The solution to this 
3The innate low-level action capabilities that involve random movements of the manipulator 
do not have an explicit representation of motor parameters in the perceptual domain, the 
implicit parameter values are generated stochastically. 
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problem is a series of attempts to detect and delete the obstructing actions 
in the sequence or adjust values of the corresponding motor parameters. 
In view of these problems we propose the following strategy of searching for the 
initial n1otor solution satisfying the behavioural goal. The process com1nences 
with measures designed to overcome the goal distance plateau. For this purpose 
the system generates random actions defined by random values of the correspond-
ing n1otor parameters. The trials proceed until a change in the magnitude of D 
has been detected. The system considers the applied action model as relevant to 
the goal no matter which changes, a descent or increase of D, have been induced. 
At the next step the algorithm minhnises the goal distance by adjusting the values 
of the motor parameters. This procedure is based on stochastic gradient search 
(62). 
In cases where single actions cannot overcome the plateau problem the systen1 
switches to another strategy that is the realisation of behavioural patterns. In this 
mode instead of generating individual actions, the agent instantiates sequences 
of available behavioural models. The choice of the 1nodels and their sequence is 
made randomly. Initially, sequences of two actions involving all possible con1bi-
nations of the existing capabilities are generated, then, sequences of three actions 
and so on until a sequence that ilnpacts on D has been found. 
If the goal-relevant solution has not been generated after a significant nu1nber 
of trials then the existing behavioural skills, perhaps, are not sufficient to ac-
complish the given goal. It is then necessary to explore other goals in order to 
acquire capabilities that 1nay help to overcome the presented problem. For ex-
ample, a syste1n learning the shape-sorter gatne may attmnpt to find the solution 
using only the initial shnple capabilities to 1nove the 1nanipulator and perfonn 
grasping. However, as it will be shown in the experhnental section, such a strat-
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egy requires an enormous amount of cornputations. The proposed exploratory 
behaviour, where the systetn autonomously learns additional capabilities, after 
a certain atnount of failures to achieve the original goal, will demonstrate rapid 
convergence of learning. 
The process of minimising the goal distance rnay deal with the plateau or local 
minima problems several times before the value of D reaches the threshold. In 
each case the system should extend the current motor sequence by a sub-sequence 
that overcomes the current problematic situation. The algoritlun of building such 
extensions is the sarne as for the general task of searching rnotor solutions de-
scribed earlier in this section. 
Finally, a formal representation of a prin1itive solution satisfying the given goal 
can be written as following. 
... ' (4.4) 
where {cik)(Pk), ... , ｃＷｾｚＩＨｐｲｫＩｽＬ＠ k = 1 ... dis the kth extension of the action se-
quence, d is the ntunber of extensions. 
A brief sun1mary of this section is that a prin1itive rnodel of a novel action ca-
pability is represented as a sequence (possibly, consisting of just one element) of 
actions that already exist in the rnotor domain. This sequence allows the systen1 
to achieve the goal frorn a specific initial state. The theoretical power of the 
tnethod is such that it can find the motor solution for considerably complex goals 
utilising only simple low-level actions (see the experimental proof in Chapter 6). 
However, it might take a large amount of co1nputations. The next step of the 
method is to transfonn this sequential representation, which depends on the cur-
rent state of the perceptual vector, into a generalised and invariant form. 
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4.4 Generalising Hierarchical Capabilities 
The mechanism of generalising action capabilities transforms the initial 'prhni-
tive' motor solution obtained via random exploration into a function f(p) that 
should return an opthnal rnotor sequence to achieve the goal. Such a function 
is also required to attain the goal state within a reasonably wide range of en-
vironmental configurations. The process of generalising involves ren1oving con-
stant rnotor parameters, erasing redundant chains in the action sequence and 
re-indexing remaining rnotor pararneters by counting the goal states. 
First of all we wish to clarify the rnechanisrn that performs percept-action pa-
rmneter linking. As we mentioned earlier the components of rnotor parmneter 
vector pare the variables with perceptual origins. However, they are not exactly 
the goal parameters. We define rnotor parameters as indices that label the states 
of the goal parameter vector g. For instance, the n1otor pararneter associated 
with the horizontal position Xmotm· of an object in an ernpty scene ranges over 
the horizontal size of the scene, say, between 0 and h. Next, suppose, we placed 
a permanent obstacle in the scene such that the object cannot be placed on top 
of it. The number of possible states for a potential goal parameter has hence 
been reduced, although, the perceptual feature Xpercept itself still belongs to [0, h), 
namely, it can be used to detennine the position of the introduced obstacle. Thus, 
Xmotor reflects the restrictions of the current physical configuration in the envi-
ronrnent, however, the abilities to perceive Xpe1·cept have not been affected. The 
initial assurnption concerning the rnotor pararneters is that they can take any 
value (in our experin1ents any integer ntnnber), however, this hypothesis is to be 
falsified in the course of exploration of the environment. 
Within certain configurations of learning tasks it is possible that for a series 
of random action instantiations one or more rnotor pararneters can rmnain con-
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stant. Such paran1eters are invariant to the perceptual context and hence do not 
influence the result of executing the action sequence. We term then1 as action 
constants. The following exa1nple illustrates the mnergence of action constants. 
Suppose that the agent's environ1nent is a 2D scene with a number of different 
objects. The n1otor domain contains a set of already known n1otor capabilities: 
• Tvloving the 1nanipulator fro1n the current position to (x, y); denoted as 
1\!I(x, y) 
• Aligning the 1nanipulator with object n; O(n) 
• Grasping 1noven1ent; G( s), where s = 0, 1 is the state of the gripper 
The learning task is to acquire a capability that 1noves object n to position (x, y). 
A successful instantiation achieving the goal is the sequence 
O(n'), ｇＨｳｾＩＬ＠ Jv!(x', y'), ｇＨｳｾＩ＠ (4.5) 
This sequence is detennined by values of five para1neters ( n', si, x', y', ｳｾＩＬ＠ how-
ever, for the given goal only three of then1, nmnely (n, x, y), can change values, for 
example to ( n", x", y"), within a certain range such that the obtained sequence 
still achieves the goal. Variation of parmneters (n, x, y) will lead to 1noving differ-
ent objects in the scene to different positions. The paran1eters s1 and s2 , however, 
should be constant: s1 = 1- gripping the object after aligning, s2 = 0- releasing 
the object after 1noving. Assigning any other values to s1,s2 will not achieve the 
goal. 
The next step of processing, learning an optimal motor solution, proceeds through 
rmnoving redundant chains in the initial action sequence. The systern atte1npts 
to attain the goal sequentially taking away the actions in the sequence that do 
not influence D. At each step, if the atte1npt succeeds (i.e. the goal has been 
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achieved), the action is completely erased fro1n the sequence. Otherwise, the 
considered action remains exactly at its previous position within the sequence 
since; not only the correct values of 1notor parameters, but also the chosen order 
of the actions are necessary for attaining the goal. 
Thus, in order to produce a novel action capability in the fonn of a function 
C = f (p) we assign a new motor parameter vector to the action sequence that 
excludes action constants, Pnew = (n, x, y). This sequence also has the redundant 
chains removed. In general, if the sequence 
(4.6) 
is opthnal for the given goal then the new motor parameter vector is given as: 
(4.7) 
where Pk E (Pq1 ,Pq2 , ••• ,pqm) are non-constant n1otor parameters. 
In this way a new capability is added to the body of total n1otor capabilities 
parruneterised in the manner indicated. Hence, in the example given, we add 
the new capability of moving objects (named /dO, say, by a sequential token 
generator) along with its corresponding 1notor parruneter vector to the total set 
of available 1notor capabilities. The detected constants are also necessary for the 
specification of the new action n1odel, however, they are included in the 1nodel 
as internal properties rather than in the forn1 of the explicit 1notor paran1eters, 
thus fi;JO = lv!O(n, x, y). 
The total set of available action capabilities at this stage of learning is: 
{lv!O(n, x, y), O(n), G(s), lv!(x, y)} 
Although there is a specifically hierarchical relationship between lv!O(n, x, y) and 
{O(n), G(s), lvf(x, y)} , in future iterations of the bootstrapping algorith1n, we 
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are free to choose motor capabilities at any level of the hierarchy. The process is 
hence consequently completely open-ended. 
Another hnportant aspect of generalising is that the algorithm does not shn-
ply detennine restrictions for the values of motor parameters, it also introduces 
novel variables that index the observed states in the space of perceptual goals. 
Let us consider another example where the syste1n learns to insert objects into 
holes while playing the shape-sorter ga1ne. The successful instantiation of action 
capabilities is one of the following actions 
ｬｶｩｏＨｮｾＬ＠ x 1, yi), 
lv!O(n2, x2, Y2), 
1\IIO(nK, X[( , YK ), 
where /( is the nu1nber of the objects (holes) in the game. 
The corresponding para1neter vector of the action 1nodel contains three coinpo-
nents, all of thmn non-constant. However, if we calculate the number of possible 
perceptual states that correspond to the solved task (an object has been inserted 
into the corresponding hole) we obtain only k cases. Therefore, we can introduce 
an index k = 1 ... /( to replace vector p = (n, x, y) as a new 1notor para1neter. 
The novel action 1nodel H(p) that solves the task of filling a hole by an object is 
hence parameterised by a single scalar nu1nber k: H(p) = H(k). 
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Summary 
In this chapter we discussed the mechanisms of learning hierarchical cognitive 
capabilities. The proposed 1nethod utilises the percept-action fran1ework that in-
volves four distinctive stages of processing: generating randon1 action sequences, 
removing redundant actions, elhninating constant motor parmneters and updat-
ing the parametric space of the percept-action representations. The driving mech-
anisin of learning is the discovery of perceptual goals represented as salient states 
of the perceptual space. The detection of such distinctive percepts is carried out 
via gathering statistics (Feature Frequency Histogran1s) over a set of exploratory 
movements in the environn1ent. Learning a generalised motor solution satisfy-
ing the goal starts with the task of minin1ising the goal distance. The initial 
action sequence that achieves the goal is acquired through a series of rando1n 
trials. It is exposed to further processing in order to find an optimal path to the 
goal state. Finally, the optimised action sequence is converted into a function of 
novel motor parameters, labelling the perceptual states that correspond to the 
attained goal. The overall process of learning capabilities progressively updates 
representations of the sensorimotor dornains and leads to the develop1nent of an 
open-ended hierarchy of percept-action models. 
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Chapter 5 
Theoretical Analysis of Learning 
Characteristics for a Specific 
Learning Scenario 
In this section we carry out theoretical consideration of system behaviour in a 
predefined environment. We analyse different stages of the learning process in 
order to estimate the perforn1ance characteristic that represents convergence of 
the learning tasks, na1nely, the nun1ber of percept-action cycles necessary for ac-
colnplishing the behavioural goal in a generic fashion. 
5.1 The Learning Scenario 
The scenario that has been chosen to implement our systein is a variant of the 
shape-sorter game. The goal of the gan1e is to insert all objects into holes of 
corresponding shape. Our system is intended to autonon1ously learn a general 
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solution of the gan1e commencing from only the primitive behavioural skills that 
involve Moving the manipulator lvf(x, y), Rotating the gripper R(O) and Perform-
ing gripping movement G(s) 
{Ci}prim = {lvf(x, y), R(O), G(s)}. (5.1) 
The algorithm should gain percept-motor capabilities sufficient to accomplish 
the shape-sorter solution fro1n any initial layout of the objects and holes and also 
independently of the irrelevant objects in the scene. The choice of the proposed 
scenario is motivated by the ability of variable environ1nental configurations to 
explicitly demonstrate the processes of gaining novel cognitive capabilities and 
representing thmn in an abstract hierarchical fashion. 
In the following discussion we provide the reader with detailed description of 
four distinctive learning stages: aligning manipulator with an object, moving an 
object, filling holes and solving the game. It is important to clarify that all the 
presented results can be obtained automatically (demonstrated explicitly later). 
The reason we have 1nanually chosen the stages of learning here is to enable the 
characterisation of the theoretical and experin1ental efficiency of bootstrapping. 
5.2 The Different Stages of the Learning See-
. 
nar1o 
5.2.1 Aligning the Gripper with Objects 
At this first stage the perceptual goal is represented by the conditions wherein 
the 1nanipulator position is equal to location (xn, Yn) of one of the objects in the 
scene. Since the 1nanipulator is also perceived as an object (we denote its position 
74 
CHAPTER 5. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF LEARNING 
CHARACTERISTICS FOR A SPECIFIC LEARNING SCENARIO 
as (xl\tJ, YM)) the goal is: 
{
XM = Xn 
YM =Yn 
n= l ... N (5.2) 
where N is the number of the objects in the scene excluding the 1nanipulator. 
Finding the relevant action sequence, performing percept-action para1neter link-
ing and rmnoving redundant chains we generalise the corresponding new action 
model (see Section 4.4) as 
(5.3) 
where O(p) is the new action 1nodel. 
To transfer the goal features (xn, Yn) into the co1nponents of paratneter vector p 
of model O(p) we analyse the possible states that can be assigned to the goal. 
According to (5.2) the nun1ber of possible 1nanipulator positions that achieve the 
goal is iV, therefore, the goal states can be indexed by scalar nun1ber n = 1 ... N. 
The parameter vector p therefore has a single component that refers to the object 
with which the 1nanipulator is aligned: 
p=n (5.4) 
O(p) = O(n) (5.5) 
5.2.2 Moving Objects 
A perceptual goal that underlies the motor capability to 1nove objects can be 
expressed by the following conditions 
{ 
ｊＸｸｾ＠ + Ｘｹｾ＠ =f 0, 
/grip= 0 
n= l ... N 
(5.6) 
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where f 91'ip is the perceptual feature that characterises the state of the actuator: 
f 97"ip = 0- gripper is off, f 9·rip = 1 - gripper is on. Equation (5.6) indicates that 
the goal is achieved if the position of the object has been changed and the gripper 
has been released. 
In contrast to the previous stage of learning there is not just a single possibility 
of generating an action sequence converging to the goal. One way is to use only 
the 'innate' capabilities of 1nanipulator control. In this case the desired sequence 
is 
C(p) = lvl(xn, Yn), G(1), lvl(x', y'), G(O) 
V(Xn- x')2 + (Yn- y') 2 =/= 0 
where (x', y') is the new position of object n. 
(5.7) 
(5.8) 
Another choice is to utilise the previously gained 1notor capability to align the 
manipulator and the object O(n) (which is silnilar to the example discussed in 
Section 4.4): 
C(p) = O(n), G(l), 1\II(x', y'), G(O) (5.9) 
To decide which of those two possibilities should be chosen we wish to estimate 
how quick in each case a sequence that achieves the goal can be instantiated 
via random exploration. In other words we would like to calculate the relative 
probability of achieving solutions (5.7) and (5.9). In the first case, the action 
domain involves only the primitive actions, hence 
(5.10) 
where Pprim is the probability to retrieve solution ( 5. 7); Pseq is the probability 
of the correct order in the sequence; PM and ｐｾ Ｑ＠ are probabilities of 1noving 
the n1anipulator to positions (xn, Yn) and ＨｸｾＬ＠ ｹｾＩ＠ respectively; Pc and Pb are 
probabilities of performing the gripping-on and gripping-off actions. 
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Sequence (5.7) has four independent action elements. The number of available 
inbuilt motor capabilities (see equation (5.1)] is I<= 3; hence 
( 1 )4 1 Pseq = J( = 81 · (5.11) 
Thus, 
1 1 1 (X- 1)(Y- 1) 1 
Pp1"im = 81 . (X- N)(Y- N) . 2 . XY . 2' (5.12) 
where X, Yare the scene height and width 1. Divider (./Y- N)(Y- N) in (5.12) 
indicates that 1noving any of N objects satisfies the goal conditions; multipli-
ers Pa and P(; are equal to ｾ＠ because the gripping state takes only two values 
s = 0, 1. 
Returning to the second case in which the algorithm exploits the previously 
learned action model 0 ( n), the nu1nber of available actions is K = 4, and the 
corresponding probability of successful instantiation Pbootst1·ap is: 
Pbootstrap = Pseq · P 0 • P G ' PM ' Pb (5.13) 
where 
( 1 )4 1 Pseq = J( = 256' (5.14) 
hence, 
R __ 1 . __!__. ｾＮ＠ (X -1)(Y- 1). ｾ＠
bootstrap - 256 N 2 XY 2. (5.15) 
Co1nparing both results we have 
Pbootst1·ap 81(X- N)(Y- N) 
-
Pprim 256JV (5.16) 
1 Equation (5.12) and further considerations in this section imply pixel-wise precision in 
determining object positions. Assuming that in the real world the error of perception is more 
significant, however, will not affect the comparative results of the bootstrapping method. 
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Asstnning that the number of objects in the scene is 1nuch less than the number 
of possible object positions (N << 1Y · Y) we obtain 
Pbootstmp = 81 . XY > > 1. 
Pprim 256 N 
(5.17) 
In our experimental setup (see Section 6) we used 300x300 pixel visual scenes and, 
typically, five different objects. Thus, in such an environ1nental configuration, the 
theoretically estimated computational gain of the hierarchical bootstrapping as 
con1pared with the percept-action learning limited to primitive actions is 
Pbootstrap ｾ＠ 5695. 
Ppr·im 
(5.18) 
According to the strategy discussed above we designate the novel capability to 
n1ove objects as a symbolic token lviO(p) and add this element into the hierarchy 
of actions. In order to create the new paran1eter vector we take into account that 
the parameters of the gripping actions in sequence (5.9) always remains constant: 
G(s) = G(1), G'(s) = G'(O). Having done so we find that vector p contains only 
three co1nponents: index n of the object to be n1oved and its new position (x, y) 
p=(n,x,y) 
lviO(p) = iVIO(n, x, y) 
5.2.3 Inserting Objects into Holes 
(5.19) 
(5.20) 
Next, we consider a scene that along with N /2 randomly scattered objects con-
tains a board with N /2 holes. Each hole has the same shape as one of the 
presented objects, i.e. all the objects can be inserted into the corresponding 
holes. Holes and objects are represented in the perceptual do1nain as 'shapes' tLi 
with certain positions (xi, Yi) and orientations ()i 
(5.21) 
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thus, the goal here is that the position and orientation of one shape (an object) 
should be the same as the position and orientation of the complmnentary shape 
(a hole), such that: 
Ym =Yn 
3 m,n = 1 ... JV. (5.22) 
f.-Lm = f.-Ln, 
The estimated co1nputational benefit of bootstrapping at this stage, calculated 
in the smne way as for the previous Subsection 5.2.2, gives: 
Pbootstmp ｾ＠ 1 Q4 
Ppr-im 
(5.23) 
The parmneter vector for the new capability H(p) responsible for filling holes is 
as follows. Suppose that 
O(n), G(1), NI(xm, Ym), R(Bm), G'(O) (5.24) 
is the retrieved action sequence. The n1otor parmneters excluding constants for 
this sequence is hence 
(5.25) 
however, the allowed number of goal states, according to (5.22), is N/2. There-
fore, all the vector components in (5.25) can be replaced by a scalar k, k = 
1 ... N /2, that indexes objects to be inserted into holes: 
p=k (5.26) 
H(p) = H(k) (5.27) 
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5.2.4 Solving the shape-sorter 
The perceptual goal of the final stage of the game differs fro1n the previous one 
only in the condition that all the objects should be inserted into the holes, i.e. 
for 'V m, n = 1 ... N: 
Ym =Yn (5.28) 
f.l.m=f.l.n 
Obviously the corresponding action sequence contains the chains of the sa1ne 
actions H(k) with different values of k. There is only one possibility to attain 
the goal- namely, insert ALL the objects into the holes. The final action n1odel 
has no paratneters since all of 1notor vector components beco1ne constants 
S(p) = H(kl), ... , H(kN/2), p = 0 (5.29) 
The estimated computational gain for the whole gatne is consequently 
Pbootst1·ap ｾ＠ 3.2 . 105. 
Pprim 
(5.30) 
Summary 
The exatnination of the learning characteristics of bootstrapping was carried out 
in order to evaluate the ntunber of the percept-action iterations required to accoin-
plish various stages of the learning scenario. The Inain outcon1e of our analysis is 
that the estirnated cmnputational cost of the proposed bootstrapping approach is 
significantly reduced as con1parecl with the conventional percept-action learning 
technique. Such perfonnance owes to the considerable compression of the motor 
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parameter space given by the generalising procedure that updates the paramet-
ric percept-action representations. Within the presented learning scenario, for 
instance, the set of 1notor parmneters corresponding to the original action vocab-
ulary involved four COlnponents, (x, y, 0, s), however, the final capability learned, 
namely to acco1nplish the shape-sorter game, was a function of an idle parameter 
vector. Thus, in the context of the considered task, the bootstrapping 1nethod 
exhibits a correlation between the increasingly abstract properties of the percept-
action models and the efficiency of gained capabilities. The higher the level of 
abstraction, the faster is the convergence of the algori tlnn. 
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Chapter 6 
Experin1ental Results 
Following the preceding theoretical outline of the performance potential of boot-
strapping percept-motor capabilities, in this section we consider a series of com-
putational experilnents intended to analyse the system behaviour at different 
stages of bootstrapping and in various configurations of the environment. The 
experhnents were carried out in the virtual environ1nent presented in Section 6.1 
that shnulates the 2D shape-sorter game. We pursue the following objectives for 
our computational study: 
• Esthnate and co1npare the overall con1putational require1nents for the pro-
posed 1nechanisms of generalised percept-action learning and hierarchical 
bootstrapping. 
• Perform the convergence test at different stages of the learning process. 
• Provide an experhnental evidence that the hierarchical world 1nodel con-
structed is relevant to the shape-sorter game; den1onstrate the contribution 
of various learning stages to acco1nplishing the final behavioural goal of the 
scenario. 
83 
--------- - -- ------- ------
6.1. Il\IIPLEJVIENTATION OF THE SYSTEJVI 
6.1 Implementation of the system 
The learning scenario in which the agent bootstraps its capabilities to play the 
shape-sorter has been impletnented within a sin1ulated world (Figure 6.1). The 
visual environ1nent contains a 2D surface (6.1-1), a manipulator (the zoorn tool) 
(6.1-2), objects of five different colours and shapes(6.1-3) and a board with five 
shaped holes (6.1-4). Using the interface, the user is able to place the requisite 
ntnnber of objects into the desired positions and insert or re1nove the board [box 
(6.1-5)]. The perceptual goal can be defined tnanually, using interface window 
( 6.1-6), or loaded from memory as a visual state of the world [see box ( 6.1-7)] . 
However, there is also a 1nechanis1n for auto1natic goal acquisition via calculating 
FFHs. 
The software consequently operates in three n1odes: 
• 'RUN' (box 6.1-8) - a sequence of tnovements simulates a user solving the 
shape-sorter. At this stage the syste1n detects perceptual goals. 
• 'PLAY'(box 6.1-9) - the agent attains the given goal by tnanipulating the 
primitive actions using the gradient search algoritlnn. 
• 'PLAY 2'(box 6.1-10) - the agent attains the goal by learning novel capa-
bilities for solving the sub-goals detected in the learning scenario. 
Box (6.1-11) dmnonstrates dynmnics of the perceptual goal distance while solving 
the game in one or another tnode. List (6.1-12) shows the current status of the 
learning process including the set of known tnotor capabilities. 
The visual scene is perceived as a Cartesian space (Figure 6.2) where each state 
corresponds to an attractor (an object or a hole) with the following con1ponents 
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Figure 6.1: The computer oftware interfa e that imulate the hape- orter learn-
ing 'cenario ( ee description). 
of visual d s ription: 
• Shap J.t 
• Cart sian po ition (x y) 
• Spatial orientation () 
• Position variation aft r pr viou percept- tion iteration ( dx dy) 
• Orientation variation after previou percept-action iteration dB. 
Expanding the perceptual domain by m ans of the po ition and orientation 
derivatives ( dx, dy) and d() resp ctively leads to a ignificant increase in the 
number of the det cted alient perceptual tate . In tion 4.2.2 we con id r d 
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Figure 6.2: Vi ual repr ntation of th p rceptual attra tor . 
an xampl where the manipulator mov ment i .. the chang of the manipu-
lator position along the horizontal and vertical directions play th central rol 
in the initial stru turing of the a tion capabiliti : the original random charact r 
of the motor b haviour h b n updat d by th intentional manipulator move-
m nt . 
The per eptual featur v ctor f h the ompon nts 
f = (/1 ... ] ) 
wh re ea h f i orr pond to a parate attractor 
] i = (J-L i xi Yi ei d i dyi dei ) 
i = 1 ... N N i the number of attractor . 
(6.1) 
(6.2) 
The p r eptual t ractor an b vi uali d as vertices of a graph r pre enting th 
p rceptual cen (Figur 6.2): dg r pr nt th Cart ian patial relationship 
among the attractors ( i Yi dxi dyi ) nod contain the orientation and hape 
information ( ei dei J-li ). 
Th go l di tance i a normalis d urn of di tanc s among attractor that 
b long to the curr nt f and goal g tat . Suppa th goal tate i a ve tor of 
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r attractors 
g = (fJl, ···,fir) (6.3) 
where gk, k = 1 ... r, have representation (6.2). If we introduce an auxiliary 
n1easure, attract or distance d(f i, gk), or d( i, k) for convenience, then goal distance 
D becon1es the following value 
N,r 
D(f,g) = L d(i, k)/(N. r) (6.4) 
i,k=l 
The attractor distance is calculated as a weighted sun1 of distances between cor-
responding cmnponents of attractor features 
d(i, k) = ｾＨ､ＧＨＧｩＬ＠ k) + d"(i, k) + d"'(i, k)); (6.5) 
where d'(i, k) is the binary shape difference 1neasure; 
{
Q J-L·i = J-Lk 
81\11 = 
1 /-Li -=1 p,k 
(6.6) 
d" ( i, k) is the angular difference of attractor orientations and orientation incre-
n1ents, 
(6.7) 
and d"' ( i, k) is the Cartesian distance between at tractor position and position 
incrmnents: 
d"'(i, k) = J(x.i- xk) 2 + (Y.i- Yk) 2 + (dxi- dxk) 2 + (dyi- dyk) 2 . ( 6.8) 
v'2X2 + 2Y2 
6.2 Configurations of the Environment 
vVe seek to test system behaviour in a variety of regimes in order to den1onstrate 
the transferability of acquired capabilities into other envirmunental settings. The 
experiments were carried out for three distinctive configurations of the sin1ulator. 
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1. In the first experin1ental setup the environment contains only the objects 
and events that are necessary for solving the shape-sorter game, what we 
call a simple environment. Nioreover, the user can guide the process of 
detecting goals by explicit demonstration of the desired behavioural func-
tionalities. The 1nanipulations are performed in such a way as to introduce 
goals incrmnentally with the following increasing scale of complexity: con-
trolled manipulator movements ｾ＠ aligning manipulator with an object ｾ＠
moving an object ｾ＠ filling holes ｾ＠ solving the game. 
2. The environment is set up as above; however, learning individual capabili-
ties is not guided by the user, instead, it relies completely on agent-world 
interaction. Although the final goal - a completed shape-sorter ga1ne, has 
been de1nonstrated the systen1 proceeds through detecting and learning the 
required hierarchy of percept-action capabilities autono1nously. 
3. Along with the pieces and holes used to play the shape-sorter the envi-
ronnlent contains other objects and events that do not influence or can 
even interrupt the solution of the final task. This is the case of a complex 
distractor-strewn environment typical of real-world scenarios. There is also 
no user-guided detection of behavioural goals in such envil·on1nents. 
The outlined experhnental configurations have been proposed with the purpose 
of investigating the difference of systmn perforrnance in the bootstrapping 1node 
and ordinary percept-action learning (characterised by the unhnodally-restricted 
'dilnensionality' of behavioural inferences). Furthermore, the indicated scenarios 
are analogous to children's cognitive learning at the early stages of development. 
In the initial stage the learning is intended to gain sin1ple capabilities via explicit 
careful demonstrations. A teacher configures the scenario, first, to train prin1itive 
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skills and then gradually increases the complexity of the goals and behaviours. 
Once the initial capabilities become available to the agent, the next stage is 
to address tasks that do not have a direct solution by n1eans of the existing 
functionalities (or for which the solution is far from optimal). However, this 
fratning envirotunent does not contain eletnents that distract or interrupt the 
process of acquiring the solution. At this level the cognitive system initialises 
a 'bootstrap' search such that instead of exploiting the existing capabilities to 
solve the probletn the agent explores the world in order to learn novel skills 
and thus tnore quickly accotnplishes the final goal. Capturing behavioural goals 
and learning the corresponding action models at this stage is carried out fully 
autonomously. Finally, the third scenario hnplies the presence of distractors in 
the scene that can lead to gaining capabilities irrelevant to the goal of the gan1e. 
The cognitive agent should be able to detect the redundant behaviours and to 
correct its strategy of interaction with the world. 
6.3 Overall Consideration of Computational Re-
quirements 
We compare two methods of learning: stochastic instantiation of paratneters 
within the set of innate action tnodels without re-parmneterisation of the percept-
action domains, and learning via generalisation of the parameter space and cre-
ating a hierarchical structure of capabilities 1 . 
Figure 6.3 shows the systetn performance for the first learning strategy. The hor-
izontal axis here is the initial perceptual distance to the goal; the vertical axis is 
1 Both methods are applied to the simple guided environment. System performance for the 
autonomous experimental configurations is addressed in Section 6.4. 
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10 
Figure 6.3: Sy tern p rforman e in th ordinary per ept-action mode. D0 is 
th initial goal di tanc n i the number of p rcept- ction cy 1 undertaken to 
achi ve the goal. 
th number of percept-action y 1 n ded to attain the urrent goal. Diffi r nt 
col ur mark th tag f the 1 arning c nario with the colour map follow : 
gr n correspond to th task of ligning th manipulator with an obj t r d i 
moving an obj t blue i in erting an obj into a hol cyan i the final tag f 
solving the hape- ort r. of initi 1 motor apabiliti contain d thr 
action : moving the manipulator rotating the actuator and p rforming gripping· 
at a h stag he sy tern arried out 200 runs in attempting to attain th orr -
sponding goal . 
Ther are two main outcom of the e xperiment . Firstly th numb r of 
p r pt-action ycles do not d p nd on th initial distance o th goal. That 
refl t the natur of th proce that in t ntiates goal-relevant action equ nc 
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Figure 6.4: System computational requirement in the bootstrapping mode. D0 
and n are the same as for Figure 6.3. 
as being invariant to the perceptual context. The econd re ult i that the com-
putational requirements grow significantly with the increase of goal complexity. 
In contrast the results obtained under the sam xperimental condition for the 
boot trapping mode (Figure 6.4) demonstrate a very compact distribution of 
percept-action cycles. Overlapping clusters of m asurements for different goals 
indicate that the complexity of the learning task remain within the arne range 
at any stage of the scenario. 
More explicit comparison of the m thods for a h of the learning t ks is pre-
sent d in Figure 6.5. It plots the average numb r of percept-action cycles at 
each stage of the game· the cyan and green curves are the conventional percept-
action learning and bootstrapping modes respectively. Here we observe a quasi-
exponential increase in the computational require1nents for the fir t approach 
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whereas the hierarchical bootstrapping demonstrat s near-constancy in the task 
complexity. Overcoming this problem of exponentially-increasing complexity thus 
makes it pos ible for the hierarchical bootstrapping approach to begin to sati fy 
the requirements of an open-ended architecture for intelligent agency . 
.ln(ii 
40 
35 (1 
3J 
25 
20 
15 
10 
Stage 
Figure 6.5: Comparativ performance: perc pt-action learning (1) again t boot-
strapping (2). Averages of percept-action c cles ( Y-axis) with respect to different 
learning stag s ( X-axis). A - Primitive Capabilities, B - Aligning with an Object 
D - Moving an Object, F - Filling a hole. 
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6.4 The Convergence Test 
In this section we investigate the syste1n perfonnance when conditioned by the 
open-ended hierarchical bootstrapping. We will analyse the con1putational re-
quireinents of the 1nethod as a function of the various learning stages. This 
benchtnark is characterised as the required number of percept-action cycles to 
complete the puzzle, averaged over a series of runs with respect to different 
starting configurations. The functions for each of three environ1nental setups 
introduced in Section 6.2 will be considered separately. 
6.4.1 The Simple Guided Environment 
The results of the convergence test within the sin1ple guided environment is shown 
on Figure 6.6 (Series (1)). The graph exhibits an approxhnately linear descent 
of the average percept-action iterations n on a logaritlunic scale. Such an evolu-
tion of n suggests that acquiring each new capability exponentially shnplifies the 
convergence on the final goal of the game. The learning environment has been 
intentionally set up so as to increase the learning cmnplexity sn1oothly and grad-
ually, providing the systen1 with sufficient behavioural functionalities for solving 
each subsequent goal. In the smne manner as for the overall analysis of the com-
putational requirements (Section 6.3) the variation of the results due to randomly 
chosen starting layouts is not significant at any stage of learning. 
The exponential decrease of n indicates that each subsequent level of the hier-
archy does indeed hnprove the ability to acco1nplish the final task, i.e. all the 
detected behaviotu·al goals are relevant to the solution of the shape-sorter. Thus, 
the given graph can be considered as a benchmark to co1npare with the other 
fully autonomous scenarios of learning. 
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Figures 6.7-6.10 illustrate trajectories of the 1nanipulator at different learning 
stages of the simple guided scenario: aligning with an object, 1noving an ob-
ject, filling a hole and solving the shape-sorter. The top scenes in each figure 
correspond to the random instantiations of the capabilities for various starting 
layouts of the environn1ent. The bottom rows show the trajectories of the ac-
tion sequences with the ren1oved redundancy. The gTeen manipulator trajectories 
demonstrate the search of n1otor parameters based on the gradient descent 2 . The 
red trajectories are the instantiations of the available action capabilities. The 
corresponding changes of the goal distance D as a function of the manipulator 
1novement i show the system's capabilities of overco1ning the local minima (fig-
ures 6. 7,6.9) and plateau (figure 6.10) proble1ns. The generalised percept-action 
1nodels at each stage thus exhibit opthnal and context-invariant solution of the 
goal tasks. 
6.4.2 The Simple Autonomous Environment 
It is important to notice that albeit in the following configuration the systmn has 
been given the overall goal (via demonstrations) of solving the shape-sorter the 
2 In our experiments we used a modified algorithm of gradient search based on repeating 
of successful movements. The first movement is always random and if it leads to a decrease 
of the goal distance then the action is repeated, if not - a new state of the motor parameter 
vector will be randomly chosen in the motor domain. The process goes until the goal distance 
becomes sufficiently small. This method does not pretend to have the best convergence among 
other gradient search techniques. However, the performance of the learning method based on 
such a conventional implementation of gradient descent will serve to emphasise the abilities of 
the bootstrap approach to cope with complex distractor-strewn scenarios (see results below). 
For further information regarding the gradient search method used in the present work refer to 
(30). 
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process of learning the necessary capabilities proceeds autono1nously through the 
exploration of the environ1nent. 
As has been shown earlier a system that possesses only primitive motor capabil-
ities requires a very large number of iterations in order to solve the shape-sorter. 
]\!Ioreover, the obtained solution cannot be generic. Hence, in further experi-
ments it would be necessary to incur significant computational costs to achieve 
the san1e goal once again. Our computational experiments demonstrate that the 
1nechanism of bootstrapping is capable of overcon1ing such issues, bringing the 
performance similar to that of the benchn1ark considered above. 
Figure 6.6 (Series 2) presents the syste1n characteristics within a shnple au-
tonomous environn1ent. It can be seen that all the stages intrinsic to the bench-
nlark behaviour have been discovered independently in the course of autonmnous 
exploration. The shapes of curves (1) and (2) in Figure 6.6 re1nain ahnost the 
sa1ne; for each subsequent level of the hierarchy the solution of the scenario be-
comes more opthnal. Analogous results, na1nely, that the solution becomes less 
sensitive to the starting layout, can be inferred fron1 the standard deviation. 
A slight modification of the system behaviour towards increased learning require-
Inents at the final stage is observable. However, notice that the configurations 
of the environ1nent considered represent a significantly 1nore generic case than 
the user-guided scenario. The syste1n is originally placed in the con1plex environ-
ment and proceeds through the autonon1ous discovering of co1nplex behaviours, 
whereas for the shnple scenario the con1plexity grows gradually under the con-
trol of the external supervisor. This den1onstrates the efficiency of the n1ethod 
provided by powerful generalising abilities of hierarchical bootstrapping. 
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Figure 6.6: The system behaviour in the various environmental configurations: 
required average number of perc pt-action cycl s (Y-axis) for the different learn-
ing stages (X-axis ee description). (1)- the simple guided environment· (2)- the 
simple atdonomous environment· (3) - the complex autonomous environment. A 
- Primitive Capabilities B - Aligning with an Object C - Lighting the Indicator. 
D - Moving an Object E - Dropping a new object, F - Filling a hole. 
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Figure 6. 7: Learning to align the manipulator with an object: random action 
equences (the top row) and the g neralised percept-a tion model (the bottom 
row). The green trajectories correspond to the gradient d scent the red trajec-
tories are the instantiations of the available action capabilities. 
6.4.3 The Complex Autonomous Environment 
Finally we analys the sy tern performan e in the autonomou regime in the 
case when the environm nt contains phenom na (objects or ev nt ) that do not 
influence (are neutral with regard to) , or even interfere with the olution of the 
shape- orter game. In the course of intera tion with the environment the sys-
tem captures the redundant phenomena in the form of behavioural goal and 
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Figure 6.8: Learning to move an object. See text and Figure 6.7 for the descrip-
tion. 
digresses' to learning the corresponding motor functionalities that however, fail 
to assist in further stages of inference. 
The software simulating the virtual environment involves two distracting phe-
nomena: 
• Lighting up an indicator when an object is placed on a labelled position 
in the scene (Figure 6.11). The position is represented by a red circle that 
enables its perceptual detection. This is a neutral event. 
• A new object is dropped in the scene if an existing object has been placed 
onto a particular labelled position. The new object has the same shape and 
colour as the object moved onto the indicated position. Thus the giv n 
event complicates the solution of the game by bringing an additional obj ct 
in to play (hence, it is an interfering event). 
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Figure 6.9: Learning to insert an object into a hole. S e t xt and Figure 6. 7 for 
the d scription. 
A erie of the experiment under the indicated configurations f th environ-
nlent have demonstrated the following system haracteristics: (Figure 6.6 (Serie 
3)). On the graph we can see two regions of non-monotonicity for function n. 
They correspond to the distractors introduced to the environm nt. The part re-
ferring to the capability of lighting up the indicator (B-C) is constant showing 
that the given functionality do s not improve the olution of the hape- orter 
cenario. The econd region of the graph in whi h the ystem becom capable 
of dropping new objects into the cene (D-E) slightly impede the sy tern from 
achieving the final goal. A sy tern that has learned to bring new object into the 
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Figure 6.10: Learning to olve the hape- orter puzzle. S e t xt and Figure 6. 7 
for the description. 
game exploit this capability to acquire olutions for other subgoals and thus it 
only complicates the problem of earching for desired behaviour . 
Nevertheles the overall performance in th giv n configuration do not indicat 
ystem failure while solving the scenario. The method does indeed requir mor 
computation for searching relevant solutions at each stage of learning. However 
ev n in the worst case of dropping new objects into the cene the function fi 
increase in ignificantly in comparison to the previous phase. The general sys-
tem tendency to achieve the goal of the game is essentially as for the benchmark 
scenario. 
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.... -· ····  
Figure 6.11: Interfering Events in Complex Autonomous Environment: lighting 
the indicator- red circle dropping a new object - black cross 
6.5 The Motor Parameter Space 
Another alternative for comparing the omputational r quirem nt for the ordi-
nary percept-action learning and bootstrapping mechani ms is to estimate the 
number of motor parameters involved in the s arch of the goal-r levant motor 
solutions. 
It has b en shown that the bootstrapping mechanism generali percept-action 
apabilities via the update of the motor parameter vector, cau ing a r duction 
of possible motor states within ea h action model. Figure 6.12 demonstrate the 
evolution of the motor paramet r dimensionality np for the ordinary percept-
action and bootstrapping learning approaches within the complex autonomous 
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environment configuration. In the first case (Figure 6.12 (Series 1)) function np 
increases significantly with the complexity of the behavioural capabilities (a par-
ticularly distinctive peak of the parameter dimensionality occurs with the final 
stage of the game, where the smne action of filling a hole has to be repeated 
several times for various values of the motor para1neters). The bootstrapping ap-
proach, in contrast, exhibits only local variations of np that finally tend toward 
zero (Figure 6.12 (Series 2)). These results hence agree with our theoretical fore-
cast when all the 1notor parameters in the action sequence beco1ne constant (such 
that the corresponding capability to solve the shape-sorter takes no parmneters, 
see equation 5.29). 
The restricted din1ensionality of motor parameter space intrinsic to the hierar-
chical bootstrapping provides us with a robust solution procedure even under the 
circumstances of distracting events and complex environmental configurations. 
Summary 
The results of our numerical experhnents have confinned the theoretical fore-
cast concerning the hnprovement of the learning convergence exhibited by boot-
strapping when con1pared with the conventional percept-action learner. The 
bootstrapping 1nethod de1nonstrates co1npact distributions for the nun1ber of 
percept-action cycles required to achieve the goal. It overcomes the problen1 
of near-exponential explosion of the con1putational requirements intrinsic to the 
traditional percept-action learning. Testing the algorithm within con1plex con-
figurations of the environ1nent, such as those including distractors, has shown 
the system capabilities of gaining robust behaviours satisfying the final goal in 
a completely autono1nous way. Finally, we explicitly demonstrated a significant 
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Figure 6.12: The quantitative evolution of the motor paramet rs for the b at-
strapping approach (1) and the ordinary percept-action learner (2). Vertical axes 
reflect the number of motor parameter whereas the horizontal axes corre pond 
to the l arning stages of the complex autonomous nvironment configuration. 
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reduction of the paran1eter space dimensionality during bootstrapping. 
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Discussion and Conclusions 
7.1 Summary of Thesis 
En1erging frmn the ideas formulated in the introductory chapter of this thesis, the 
main objective of the undertaken research work was to investigate the possibilities 
of developing learning 1nechanisn1s that enable a systen1 to exhibit capabilities of 
autonon1ous cognitive learning within con1plex unstructured environn1ents. We 
reviewed a nu1nber of approaches in Artificial Cognition with the intention of 
identifying and validating possible solutions for such an a1nbitious scientific goal. 
Our analysis suggests that the 1najority of conventional methods of n1achine learn-
ing are incapable of overcoming a range of problems in this area. In particular, 
the significant use of problem-specific knowledge lin1its the ability to adopt and 
to learn solutions for new tasks and thus to gain novel cognitive competences 
in an autonomous way. The funda1nental asstunption of the proposed 1nethod is 
that cognitive competences should be learned in the course of interaction with the 
world, not inbuilt at the design stage. However, such a systmn needs to possess 
mechanis1ns of self-modification in order to change its internal representations in 
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response to the contact with the environment. as it is fundamentally impossible 
for a system to 1nodel itself co1npletely, the processes of self-organisation must 
c01nmence fron1 shnple innate hypotheses and proceed through the stages of in-
creasing complexity, accunlluating and formulating novel cognitive capabilities. 
Existing basic competences, such as the ability to n1ove the manipulator from A 
to B, allow the validation of the obtained concepts and hence develop percep-
tual representations grounded in the physical world by means of corresponding 
actions. It has been shown that the structure of cognitive skills should be devel-
oped in a hierarchical fashion wherein any representation is grounded via lower 
intermediate levels. 
The proposed representation of cognitive c01npetences is a compact, context in-
variant 1nodel incorporating previous percept-action experience. The process of 
developing high-level capabilities in a hierarchical fashion rests on a novel n1ech-
anisn1 of secondary utilisation of the 1nodels acquired for further learning. The 
essence of this procedtu·e consists in reprogra1n1ning representations (parame-
ter spaces) of the percept-action do1nain such that the processes of perception 
and motor response beco1ne 1nore generalised and complex. Thus, the suggested 
n1ethodology requires a unified, i.e. generic, representation of percept-action 
1nodels. 
In this work we attempted to develop a systen1 architecture capable of acquiring 
cognitive representations in a generic fashion. The proposed solution is based 
on the idea of detecting salient perceptual states of the scene (via rando1n ex-
ploratory 1novements, for instance) and to define procedures of attaining those 
states by means of internal motor capabilities in any environn1ental configura-
tions. Selected perceptual states, considered as behavioural goals, coupled with 
generalised motor solutions have been proposed as a representation of percept-
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action capabilities. 
Utilising explicit para1netric representations of the sensorimotor space, the capa-
bility models co1nbine a number of links among various subsets of parameters in 
the perceptual and action domains. Restructuring of the percept-action space is 
carried out via indexing these subsets in terms of new variables. At each new 
level of representation the dhnensionality of the search space is reduced such that 
it creates a botto1n-up hierarchy of gained capabilities. However, the developed 
hierarchy is not pyrmnidal (being a substunption lattice). At each level of per-
ceptual representation the system 1nay detect several perceptual goals such that 
it is able to learn corresponding motor solutions using the available action vo-
cabulary. This leads to the emergence of parallel perceptual representations for 
each parametric configuration in the motor do1nain. Thus, the learning process 
and consequently the representation of the environment are open-ended. 
Learning individual cognitive capabilities is achieved over a continuous percept-
action cycle with a random sem·ch of goal solutions within the current representa-
tion of the perceptual domain. The 1nechanisn1 is designed to minirnise the goal 
distance. Since the distance measure has been introduced for current perceptual 
representations (not for the low-level primitive features) the bootstrapping pro-
cess also i1nplies that the goal distance can be learned. The results obtained in 
the course of an experhnental study with the 2D shnulator exhibit robustness 
of the learning procedure under various environn1ental conditions including the 
presence of different interfering events. It has been den1onstrated that the sys-
tenl autonmnously proceeds through the discovery of the perceptual goals and 
acquires invariant solutions for reaching the goal states. It has been demonstrated 
that the proposed hierarchical bootstrapping with the percept-action parameter 
update achieves a significant acceleration of learning convergence in comparison 
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with conventional percept-action learners. 
7.2 Broader Perspectives on Bootstrap Cogni-
tion 
7.2.1 Philosophical Motivation for Cognitive Bootstrap-
ping 
The central probletn concerning philosophical validation of cognitive bootstrap-
ping addresses the question of how a cognitive system capable of modifying its 
internal representations can validate them while retaining an objective descrip-
tion of the environment [82]. There are two major philosophical approaches that 
are relevant, corresponding to the school, of two principle figures: 
• Descartes postulated that there is nothing certain about the external 
world; what is known only refers to cognitive agent's existence and its 
capacities of thinking. 
• Kant postulated the existence of external objects as an a priori condition 
for cognition and cognitive representation. 
The first viewpoint later en1erged in the form of the classical sy1nbolic approach 
to artificial cognition presuming that the 1nost abstract and formalised entities 
are the n1ost certain: there hence followed the top-down ideology of connecting 
high-level concepts with sensorhnotor infonnation. 
According to Kant, however, there exists a range of individual object possibilities 
that are epn1irically validated by direct cognitive experience. A priori constraints 
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between the agent and external entities thus prin1arily concern the unity of cog-
nition as a pennanent representational process despite changing perception. This 
property directly follows the asstnnption of the existence of external objects to 
which the cognition refers. Cognition hence arises as a synthetic unity out of 
the funda1nental tn1derlying 'physical' or material world. Cognition hence has an 
e1nergent character and is necessarily embodied within the environment having a 
distinct location in tin1e and space. Cognitive concepts refer to extended spatial 
and te1nporal events, and hence their representations should be co1npact and in-
variant. An agent realises the constraints of its cognitive perception by means of 
a priori cognitive categories such that any further high-level representation is a 
subject of validation in tern1s of the pre-existing concepts. 
Our bootstrapping approach consequently com1nences with an initiatory set of 
assumptions - the bootstrap hypotheses, that, we argue, correspond to the Kan-
tian a priori categories underlying cognition. The bootstrapping approach hence 
beco1nes an essential n1ethodology for understanding and n1odelling open-ended 
biological cognition. 
7.2.2 Discussion of Cognitive Science Issues 
Research work in Cognitive Science is particularly concerned with understand-
ing mechanisms underlying cognition. Cognitive Science can be distinguished 
from philosophy by mnploying mnpiricisn1 as the 1nain 1nethodology of verifying 
1nechanis1ns of mind. The 1najor concern of the discipline fro1n the perspective 
of autono1nous learning is developing cognitive categories that are 1neaningful in 
relation to the environment. In this context cognitive bootstrapping addresses 
two key aspects: 
1. Construction of Meaningful Bootstrap Hypotheses. Such a require-
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ment refers to the set of initial cognitive categories that are guaranteed to 
be representative, i.e grounded with the physical context of the world. In 
living organisms the solution of this problem is provided by natural selec-
tion. Since for artificial cognition such mechanisms are inapplicable the 
task of creating the bootstrap categories it beco1nes the responsibility of 
the developer. In our work it has been demonstrated that such a lnech-
anism can be incorporated in the syste1n and that the provisions of a set 
of low-level local perceptual features can be sufficient to fonnulate a hier-
archy of abstract representations involving notions of objects, holes and a 
puzzle-garne. 
2. Updating Cognitive Representations. This problem is concerned with 
tnechanisms of developing cognitive representations on the basis of existing 
categories that however do not necessarily explicitly involve the initial set 
of 'correct' a priori concepts. The underlying tnethod here is the pruning of 
the composed grounded categories within a procedure ahned at discovering 
invariant significant percept-action infonnation and the intentional applica-
tion of novel sensorhnotor data. The latter is facilitated via the acquisition 
and exploration of new perceptual goals. Thus, the proposed mechanism of 
attaining behavioural goals by use of the system's own 1notor capabilities 
appears to be a key stage of fonnulating 1neaningful cognitive concepts; 
the systmn hence exhibits self-foundation (within the lhnits of the a priori 
constraints). 
Furthennore, the bootstrapping approach established its capabilities to overcon1e 
other problems addressed by Cognitive Science in both, the symbolic and connec-
tionist schools, namely, the ability to produce grounded sytnbolic representations 
using only percept-action connections. 
110 
CHAPTER 7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.2.3 Computational Perspective on Bootstrap Learning 
Investigating the bootstrapping approach frorn the perspective of Cornputational 
Science corresponds to developing computer systems capable of re-prograrnrning 
themselves. In the theoretical research of infonnational processes this problem 
is resonant of the notion of Turing equivalent languages in which a system can 
acquire a language with sufficient power in order to express any cornputation, i.e. 
emulating any con1putationallanguage such that it is theoretically able to mnu-
late itself 1. Thus, a Turing-complete subset of a language creates possibilities of 
self-extension and bootstrapping the rest of the language that does not contain 
explicit traces of the original constructions. 
Another exarnple of computational bootstrapping appears in loading an operating 
system. An operating systern is used to mediate between hardware and software, 
however, being software itself, an operating systern must be first loaded on the 
hardware requiring further interface between hardware and software and so on. 
This issue of infinite regression can be overcon1e by introducing a sirnple inbuilt 
operating systern (a bootstrap loader) with sufficient functionality to perform the 
loading task of the n1ain operating system. This bootstrap loader is thus in a 
sense of an a priori computational construct required for bootstrapping. 
Taking into account that the majority of artificial cognitive agents utilise conven-
tional computer systerns, the phenomenon of self-programrning constitutes a dis-
tinctive parallel with the algorithrns of bootstrap learning. For instance, we can 
treat the processes of learning proposed in this thesis such that the progrannning 
language primitives, represented as pararnetric elernents of the percept-action 
domains, lead, via bootstrapping, to formulating updated cognitive concepts in 
terms of novel percept-action relations through indexing quasi-static subspaces 
1 Albeit incompletely to avoid the halting problem. 
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of the previous representations. 
7.3 Implementation and Further Development 
The bootstrapping solution for n1odelling artificial cognition reveals another as-
pect to be addressed in consequent research. The matter concerns the ability to 
exploit capabilities acquired in a certain environmental configuration for other 
absolutely different surrounding conditions and learning scenarios. The probletn 
is known as knowledge transferability and is related to the syste1n properties of 
grounding the internal knowledge representations with the physical attributes of 
external world entities. For instance, the co1npetence to 1nove objects that has 
been learned within the shape-sorter scenario can be employed not only for the 
shaped pieces of the puzzle game but also to manipulate chess figures or collect 
parts for assen1bling packaged units. In so1ne cases the agent 1night find out that 
the existing models do not exhibit the optin1al performance and hence need to 
be refined. However, the processes of hnproving the available capabilities con-
verges to the goal1nuch faster than a syste1n that possesses only the primitive 
behavioural skills. 
The ability to transfer learning n1akes prerequisites for creating agents that au-
tonmnously operate in various environments incrementally improving their con1-
petences to interact with the world. A possible engineering application of the 
n1ethod is a scenario in which the system bootstraps up to a certain level within 
a sin1ulated environment (as a classroon1 stage) and successfully exploits and 
improves the gained skills in the real environment thereafter. Such an implenlen-
tation allows the agent to achieve efficient acquisition of the desired cognitive 
knowledge by tneans of rapid computerised simulations that, however, provide 
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sufficient means to proceed through further learning and operation in real world 
conditions. 
As has been pointed out, the above presented work was intended to investigate ini-
tial stages of bootstrapping cognitive categories up to the level of object-centred 
representation of the world. 1\1Iechanis1ns for learning novel behavioural capabil-
ities rely on perceptual goals detected as salient perceptual states. However, we 
considered this mechanis1n only as one possible way of exploring the environtnent 
being intended only to formulate basic cognitive concepts. We also argued that 
further stages of learning can be addressed as processes of detecting novelty in the 
scene, i.e. events in the world that cannot be explained in tenus of the existing 
representations. This procedure directly follows from the system's capabilities 
to transfer learning and is conducted by testing available properties in unknown 
environmental configurations. 
Beyond the botto1n-up 1nechanisn1s of bootstrap learning considered in the thesis 
we briefly discussed aspects of emerging feedback fro1n the high-level representa-
tions in the course of validating novel low-level hypotheses. Such tnechanistns re-
quire further formalisation. Applying top-down validation that relies on grounded 
syn1bolic concepts would serve as further evidence to support the universal char-
acter of the bootstrapping approach and its power to deal with an unconstrained 
range of cognitive probletns. 
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